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I. INTRODUCTION 
Brazil is, by any measure, an extremely large and diverse 
country.  It is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of 
land area – the largest in the Southern Hemisphere – and its 
population of 190 million is eclipsed only by China, India, the 
United States, and Indonesia.1  Brazil’s recent economic boom has 
raised it to the level of the seventh largest economy in the world 
as of 2010, and projections indicate that it will become the fifth 
largest within the next few years, if not sooner.2  In addition to 
this vast area, population, and expanding economy, Brazil is 
 
* J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University Law School, 2012; M.A. 
Candidate, Latin American & Hemispheric Studies, Elliott School of 
International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2012.  Research for 
this article was done on site at the High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de 
Justiça) in Brasília, Brazil, from May to August 2011.  All translations were 
done by the author unless otherwise indicated.  The author wishes to thank 
Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin of the High Court of Brazil for his guidance 
and comments, and his staff in Brasília, particularly Gustavo Carneiro and 
Ludmilla Gagnor, for their academic and logistical support, as well as their 
kindness, throughout this project.  Thanks also to Professor Eckard Rehbinder 
of the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, for insightful comments.  
Correspondence may be addressed to the author at nbryner@law.gwu.edu. 
 1. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, BRAZIL: FIVE CENTURIES OF CHANGE 1 (2d ed. 2010); 
2010 Census Results, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATISTICA (Nov. 
29, 2010), http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/presidencia/noticias/noticia_visualiza. 
php?id_noticia=1766&id_pagina=1. 
 2. Measuring Brazil’s Economy: Statistics and Lies, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18333018. 
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home to roughly one-fourth of the world’s plant species3 and 
numerous animal species, making it a critical site for biodiversity 
conservation and a flashpoint for discussions of environmental 
law and natural resource management in the developing world.  
In 2009, the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) reported that Brazil is home to some six percent of the 
world’s endangered species, one of the highest totals for any 
country.4 
In terms of biodiversity, Brazil is, of course, best known for 
the Amazon Basin – the vast forest ecosystem occupied by the 
world’s largest (and by some accounts longest) river system.  The 
Amazon is still fantasized by those seeking the routes of lost 
explorers from long ago,5 and by the likes of James Cameron, the 
film director, who likened the area and the plight of the 
indigenous Amazonians to the mythical resource-rich planet 
Pandora and its azure-skinned inhabitants from his most recent 
movie, Avatar.6  Brazil is also home to several other biomes that 
are significant to global biodiversity conservation efforts.  In 
2000, Norman Myers listed two areas of Brazil, the Cerrado 
highlands and the Atlantic Forest, among twenty-five critical 
biodiversity “hotspots” because of the degree of vegetation change 
and habitat degradation that has already occurred in those 
areas.7  An extensive study of the Atlantic Forest – home to over 
20,000 plant species and thousands of animal species – showed 
that as of 2005, less than twelve percent of the original forest 
cover remains.8  While this estimate is higher than that of 
 
 3. SKIDMORE, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. Simon Choppin, Red List 2009: Endangered Species for Every Country in 
the World, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2009, 11:49 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/datablog/2009/oct/23/endangered-species-red-list-data-review. 
 5. See David Grann, The Lost City of Z: A Quest to Uncover the Secrets of the 
Amazon, NEW YORKER (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/ 
2005/09/19/050919fa_fact_grann. 
 6. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Tribes of Amazon Find an Ally Out of ‘Avatar’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/world/americas/ 
11brazil.html?scp=2&sq=james%20cameron&st=cse. 
 7. Norman Myers et al., Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities, 
403 NATURE 853, 853-54 (2000). 
 8. Milton Cezar Ribeiro et al., The Brazilian Atlantic Forest: How Much is 
Left, and How is the Remaining Forest Distributed? Implications for 
Conservation, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1141, 1141, 1144-45 (2009). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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previous studies, the study shows a high rate of fragmentation 
among remaining forests, which raises strong concerns for the 
conservation of biodiversity endemic to the area.9  In the Cerrado, 
estimates of remaining vegetation range from 44.5 percent to 60.5 
percent of total land area, leaving the biome’s 7,000 plant species 
and numerous birds, fish, reptiles, amphibians, and invertebrates 
vulnerable to habitat destruction.10 
Ever since Portuguese explorers first landed on Brazil’s 
Atlantic coast in 1500, the country has frequently carried the 
image of a wild, vast territory with nearly unlimited natural 
resources.  While the image of a “pristine” pre-Columbian 
continent, untouched by humans, is inaccurate,11 five centuries of 
resource exploitation and commodity-driven economic growth 
have transformed an immense area of land, creating a culture 
that equates progress and modernization with large-scale 
development – to the detriment of environmental concerns.12  
Consider the effects of 300 years of colonial mercantilist 
economics in Brazil: one of the main goals of the colonial 
Portuguese economic system was to extract minerals (especially 
gold) and other natural resources, such as the brazilwood – a tree 
so heavily overexploited during the 1500s that the Portuguese 
had to send guards to protect against extraction in certain areas 
in 1605.13 
 
 9. Id. at 1145–46. 
 10. Carlos A. Klink & Ricardo B. Machado, Conservation of the Brazilian 
Cerrado, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 707, 708–09 (2005); see also EDSON EYJI 
SANO ET AL., EMBRAPA, MAPEAMENTO DE COBERTURA VEGETAL DO BIOMA CERRADO: 
ESTRATÉGIAS E RESULTADOS [BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH CORPORATION, 
MAPPING OF CERRADO BIOME PLANT COVER: STRATEGIES AND RESULTS], ISSN 1517 
– 5111 (2007), available at http://www.cpac.embrapa.br/download/1204/t. 
 11. See, e.g., William M. Denevan, The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the 
Americas in 1492, 82 ANNALS  ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 369 (1992). 
 12. See S.T.J., REsp No. 840.918/DF (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana 
Calmon, 14.11.2008 (Sept. 10, 2010), at 33 (Braz.) (majority opinion, Min. 
Antonio Herman Benjamin). 
 13. Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation 
in the Atlantic Forest of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA: 
BIODIVERSITY STATUS, THREATS, AND OUTLOOK 103, 105 (Carlos Galindo-Leal & 
Ibsen de Gusmão Câmara eds., 2003); Arlindo Daibert, Historical Views on 
Environment and Environmental Law in Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
779, 799-800 (2009). 
3
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The other major product in the colony was sugar, which was 
the main driver of the slave labor system that forcibly brought 
millions of Africans to Brazil.  The expansion of sugar cultivation 
throughout the colonial period led to widespread clearing of the 
Atlantic Forest in Northeast Brazil.14  The legacy of the colonial 
system was carried over in many ways since 1822, when Brazil 
(although led by the heir to the Portuguese throne, Dom Pedro I) 
formally declared its independence from Portugal.  The continued 
implementation of commodity-exporting policies followed the rise 
of a new crop in Southeast Brazil, coffee, which contributed 
further to the deterioration of Atlantic Forest areas.15 
With the explosion of population and rapid urbanization that 
has occurred in Brazil since the mid-twentieth century,16 the 
country now faces two simultaneous, but markedly different, 
environmental crises.  The first is more widely known 
internationally: the problem of deforestation, habitat destruction, 
and loss of biodiversity in the Amazon Basin and other key 
ecosystems.  Throughout most of Brazil’s history, the Amazon 
Basin itself, the largest and most diverse area from a biodiversity 
standpoint, remained relatively untouched and inaccessible.  
Even during the region’s rubber boom in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the interior of the Amazon was not 
deeply affected.17  During the past few decades, however, this has 
changed, and the Amazon has become enveloped in much of the 
same process, from large-scale road and “colonization” projects to 
 
 14. Young, supra note 13, at 105. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Brazil’s population has grown from approximately 41 million people, with 
13 million living in urban areas, in 1940, to over 190 million, with over 160 
million urban dwellers, in 2010.  Dados Históricos dos Censos, INSTITUTO 
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATISTICA, http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/ 
estatistica/populacao/censohistorico/ 1940_1996.shtm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2012); INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATISTICA, SINOPSE DO CENSO 
DEMOGRÁFICO 2010 Tabela 1.15 (2010), available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/ 
home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/tabelas_pdf/Brasil_tab_1_15.pdf. 
 17. Long after the rubber boom ended, rubber tappers, most famously led by 
Chico Mendes, became allies of the environmental movement in the region, 
resisting outside encroachment on the Amazon.  See generally ANDREW REVKIN, 
THE BURNING SEASON: THE MURDER OF CHICO MENDES AND THE FIGHT FOR THE 
AMAZON RAIN FOREST (1990). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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clearing land for new commodity exports, such as soy18 and beef, 
which have fueled land change and degradation in the Cerrado, 
the Atlantic Forest, and other parts of Brazil. 
Second, alongside these challenges to the biodiversity in 
Brazil’s forests and remote areas, the rapid growth, urbanization, 
and industrialization of the past century have left a legacy of 
urban pollution.19  This crisis may not be seen as having the same 
global impact, but it affects a great number of Brazilians on a 
daily basis.  São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s two largest 
metropolitan areas, have grown into megacities with populations 
of 19.7 and 11.8 million, respectively.20  They are known for their 
vast disparities between wealthy neighborhoods and destitute 
favelas, or slums.  Poor sanitation, overcrowding, and 
industrialization lead to water and air pollution, which in turn 
create numerous health concerns.21  Overcrowding and 
construction of poor neighborhoods on steep hills lead to the 
possibility of dangerous mudslides, such as the tragic slide that 
killed over six hundred people during strong rainstorms in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro in early 2011.22 
In response, over the past several decades, Brazil has 
developed an extensive system of environmental laws – including 
 
 18. Brazil is now the world’s second-leading soy exporter.  See Soybeans and 
Oil Crops: Trade, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda. 
gov/Briefing/Soybeansoilcrops/trade.htm#foreign (last updated Mar. 31, 2011). 
 19. See generally Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 1 (1988). 
 20. These figures come from Brazil’s 2010 Census and represent the total 
population of all municipalities commonly defined as within the metropolitan 
areas of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, respectively.  See São Paulo, INSTITUTO 
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATISTICA, http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/ 
link.php?uf=sp (last visited Feb. 25, 2012); Rio de Janeiro, INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO 
DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATISTICA, http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/link.php?uf=rj 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 21. Brazil produces roughly 160,000 tons of urban solid waste per day, 
creating enormous challenges for collection and disposal.  See Solid Waste, 
BRASIL GOV’T, http://www.brasil.gov.br/sobre/environment/solid-waste (last 
visited March 17, 2012).  For a personal account of the problems experienced by 
favela dwellers in São Paulo, see CAROLINA MARIA DE JESUS, CHILD OF THE DARK 
(1963) . 
 22. Paulo Prada & Diana Kinch, Brazil Landslide and Flood Toll Reaches 
665, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704029704576087893783940786.html. 
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detailed provisions in the current Constitution, enacted in 1988 – 
to address these problems.23  The Constitution of 1988 articulates 
both a right to an “ecologically balanced environment” as well as 
a duty on the part of the government and the community “to 
defend and preserve [the environment] for present and future 
generations.”24  The constitutional text imposes several 
obligations on the government in furtherance of this right and 
duty,25 but it does not specify exactly how this is to occur, or 
which entities or branches of government should take the lead in 
environmental protection.  Furthermore, mere articulation of 
regulations, laws, and constitutional duties means little without 
effective compliance and enforcement.26 
How, then, is environmental law and regulation implemented 
in Brazil?  Other authors have written how difficult it can be, 
facing the inertia of cultural and political traditions, to find a law 
that effectively “sticks.”27  Professor Lesley McAllister recently 
wrote about the development of the Ministério Público, Brazil’s 
public prosecutors’ office, as a major player in the enforcement of 
Brazil’s environmental law.28  The focus of this article, however, 
is on the role of another government actor, the High Court of 
Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ)), in giving effect to 
Brazil’s constitutional and legal mandates regarding the 
environment.  By 2010, the STJ had decided some three thousand 
environmentally-focused cases – making it Brazil’s “green 
 
 23. See generally Antonio Herman de Vasconcellos e Benjamin, Direito 
Constitucional Ambiental Brasileiro, in DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL AMBIENTAL 
BRASILEIRO 57-130 (José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho & José Rubens Morato Leite 
eds., 2007). 
 24. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 225 (Braz.) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION].  
An English translation, including amendments through 1996, is available from 
Political Database of the Americas: Federative Republic of Brazil, GEORGETOWN 
UNIV., http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/ english96.html (last 
updated Nov. 2008). 
 25. Id. at art. 225, para. 1. 
 26. See generally Antônio Herman V. Benjamin, O Estado Teatral e a 
Implementação do Direito Ambiental, in DIREITO, ÁGUA E VIDA 335 (Antônio 
Herman V. Benjamin ed., 2003). 
 27. See, e.g., Colin Crawford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (and 
Unrelenting) Challenges of Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding “the Law 
that Sticks”, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007). 
 28. LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL (2008). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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court”29 – and received high praise from officials in the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for transparency and 
innovation in its environmental law jurisprudence.30  In the past 
several years, the STJ has taken great strides toward compliance 
and enforcement of environmental law, challenging cultural 
practices and demonstrating a strong understanding and 
consciousness of environmental problems in the country.  Every 
move Brazil makes toward compliance and enforcement can have 
a great impact on the rest of the developing world, especially on 
neighboring countries with which Brazil shares biomes like the 
Amazon Basin and the Pantanal wetlands.  Given Brazil’s rise in 
global influence – the country has been seen as a rising star ever 
since an economist at Goldman Sachs included it as one of the 
“BRICs”31 – other countries will undoubtedly look to Brazil’s 
environmental protection efforts as a model for pursuing future 
development. 
The objectives of this article in examining the STJ are 
twofold: first, to provide an English-speaking audience with a 
greater degree of access to environmental jurisprudence in Brazil; 
and second, to analyze the STJ’s efforts to strengthen compliance 
and enforcement of environmental law and what may be learned 
from its experience since its creation in 1988.  Part I of the article 
presents a brief discussion of the history of environmental law in 
Brazil, including the constitutionalization of environmental 
protection in 1988.  Part II follows with an introduction to the 
history, structure, and operational process of the STJ.  Part III 
analyzes selected areas of the STJ’s environmental jurisprudence, 
focusing on the Court’s approach in interpreting key 
environmental statutes and applying strict civil liability for 
environmental damage.  Admittedly, this selection is limited, and 
cannot cover many important environmental law topics, but it 
 
 29. Interview with Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin, Superior Tribunal de 
Justiça, in Brasília, Braz. (May 13, 2011) (on file with author). 
 30. See Especialistas Internacionais Destacam Protagonismo do STJ em 
Questões Ambientais, S.T.J., http://www.stj.jus.br/portal_stj/publicacao/engine. 
wsp?tmp.area=398&tmp.texto=97453 (May 30, 2010, 10:00 AM). 
 31. See, e.g., The BRICs: The Trillion-Dollar Club, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15912964. 
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provides an overview of some of the key issues the Court has 
dealt with.32  Part IV concludes by considering the STJ’s role in 
challenging old cultural perceptions and unsustainable practices 
in Brazil. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW IN BRAZIL 
Brazilian environmental law faces a strong challenge: it must 
be able to effectively address threats to biodiversity in critical 
ecosystems from the Amazon to the Atlantic Forest and the 
Pantanal to the Cerrado,33 as well as the tremendous human 
environmental impact of overcrowding, poor sanitation, and 
industrial pollution in urban areas. 
A.  Phases of Environmental Law in Brazil 
These environmental problems eventually gave rise to a 
movement to establish environmental laws, norms, and 
regulations.  Brazilian scholars identify three phases of 
environmental law in the country’s history.34  The first phase, 
while quite limited in scope, dates from the colonial era into the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  The elements of law that we 
would consider today to be within the realm of environmental law 
were at that time homocentric, focusing primarily on the 
economic need to maintain some controls on the exploitation of 
natural resources used and commercialized by the colonial 
population.35 
The second phase, which occurred during the middle of the 
twentieth century, was also homocentric, but shifted the focus to 
preserving the health of the population, recognizing that certain 
 
 32. This Article does not address, for example, laws regarding environmental 
crimes in Brazil or the issue of standing to bring environmental claims.  Some 
treatment of additional environmental issues and how they are resolved in the 
STJ can be found in DIREITO AMBIENTAL NO STJ (Jarbas Soares Júnior & 
Luciano José Alvarenga eds., 2010). 
 33. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 34. Antônio Herman V. Benjamin, Introdução ao Direito Ambiental 
Brasileiro, 14 REVISTA DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL 48, 50-52 (1999); see also MARCELO 
ABELHA RODRIGUES, PROCESSO CIVIL AMBIENTAL 19-26 (2010). 
 35. RODRIGUES, supra note 34, at 20-21. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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industrial activities that altered the environment also had 
negative consequences for people living nearby.36  During this 
second phase, however, Brazil did put in place a crucial piece of 
its environmental management regime.  Brazil had first enacted 
a Forest Code (Código Florestal) to manage areas with vegetation 
in 1934; in 1965, it was replaced by the current Forest Code, 
which declares that forests are “goods of common interest” and 
places requirements on landowners to set aside portions of their 
lands to be preserved with natural vegetation.37  As Crawford 
and Pignataro have described, the Forest Code is a product of its 
era – enacted under the military dictatorship that governed the 
country from 1964 to 1985 – as it is characterized by strong, 
coercive state authority.38  Despite repeated efforts to amend the 
Forest Code over the past decade – the Brazilian Chamber of 
Deputies approved legislation in 2011 that would significantly 
weaken it39 – it remains today as the foundation of Brazilian law 
governing the protection of flora. 
Meanwhile, the international environmental movement 
began to make significant progress, culminating in the first major 
international conference (and declaration) on the environment in 
Stockholm in 1972.  The Stockholm Declaration calls repeatedly 
on States to take action toward environmental protection, 
including, for example, the injunction in Principle 13: 
States should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to 
their development planning so as to ensure that development is 
 
 36. Id. at 21-22. 
 37. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] arts. 1, 2, 16, Lei No. 4.771, 
de 15 de Setembro de 1965 (Braz.), available at https://www.planalto. 
gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l4771.htm; see also Brazil Congress Again Delays Vote on 
Key Forest Law, BBC NEWS, May 12, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
latin-america-13373293. 
 38. Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 27, at 25. 
 39. See Paulo Adario, Op-Ed: Brazil Risks Protection Record by Proposing 
Changes to Forest Code, THEGUARDIAN, May 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/environment/2011/ may/27/brazil-forest-protection-code.  A different version 
of the legislation passed in the Brazilian Senate in December 2011; the two bills 
must be reconciled and receive approval from the President in order for the new 
Forest Code to become law.  See Iara Lemos, Senado Aprova Novo Código 
Florestal, G1.GLOBO.COM (Dec. 7, 2011, 08:34 AM), http://g1.globo.com/politica/ 
noticia/2011/12/senado-aprova-texto-base-do-novo-codigo-florestal.html. 
9
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compatible with the need to protect and improve environment for 
the benefit of their population.40 
Coinciding with growth in the international movement, the 
third (and current) phase of environmental law in Brazil began in 
the 1980s, with three crucial events.  Important in this transition 
to the current phase was another shift in the objectives of 
environmental law; in this third phase, the law becomes less 
homocentric and more ecocentric, concerned with protecting and 
preserving ecosystems and the environment as an end unto itself, 
rather than solely as a means for economic activity or an 
ingredient to human health.41 
In 1981, Brazil’s Congress took a major step in this direction 
by passing the National Environmental Policy Act (Lei da Política 
Nacional do Meio Ambiente, or LPNMA).42  The LPNMA 
organizes a system of government entities responsible for 
environmental protection, known as the National Environment 
System (SISNAMA), and led by the newly created National 
Environment Council (CONAMA), which was given strong 
regulatory powers.43  Drawing on the experience of the United 
States’ National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the LPNMA 
creates a system of environmental permits, which was fleshed out 
in CONAMA’s Resolution No. 1 to include procedures for 
environmental impact assessments and reports.44  In addition, 
the LPNMA institutes strict liability for environmental harms.45 
 
 40. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF/48/14/REV.1 (June 16, 1972), available at http://www.unep.org/ 
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503. 
 41. See, e.g., RODRIGUES, supra note 34, at 22-26. 
 42. Lei da Política Nacional do Meio Ambiente (National Environmental 
Policy Act), Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6938.htm. 
 43. Id. arts. 6, 8. 
 44. Id. art. 10; CONAMA Resolution No. 1, de 23 de Janeiro de 1986, 
available at http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/res/res86/res0186.html; see 
also Ingo Sarlet & Tiago Fensterseifer, Brazil, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 249, 253 (Louis J. 
Kotzé & Alexander R. Paterson eds., 2009); ANTÔNIO F. G. BELTRÃO, CURSO DE 
DIREITO AMBIENTAL 53 (2009). 
 45. Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 14, § 1. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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The next key piece of legislation that followed in 1980s was 
the Public Civil Action Act, signed in 1985 by José Sarney, the 
first civilian president following the military dictatorship.46  
Although it was not specifically limited to environmental 
concerns, the Act created a cause of action under which 
prosecutors and civil society organizations could bring civil suits 
for injunctive relief and damages in cases involving collective and 
diffuse interests, greatly expanding the ability of both the public 
and prosecutors to demand that private parties and government 
agencies comply with existing environmental laws.47 
The third crucial piece to the transition to a more ecocentric 
approach in Brazil was the drafting of the new civilian 
Constitution of 1988, discussed below.48 
B.  The Environment and the Constitution of 1988 
The development and adoption of Brazil’s new Constitution 
in 1988 marked a significant step in the transition from military 
rule to a democratic government.  The Constitution of 1988 
included (as noted above), for the first time in Brazil’s history, a 
constitutional right related to the environment – declaring both a 
right for all and a duty to protect the environment.49  The text of 
the heading to Article 225 reads: 
[a]ll have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, 
which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy 
quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall 
have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future 
generations.50 
 
 46. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L7347orig.htm. 
 47. Id. art. 1, cls. I, IV. 
 48. Other important pieces of environmental legislation post-date the 
Constitution but are not discussed at length in this Article.  One such example 
is the Crimes Against the Environment Act of 1998, which imposes criminal 
liability both on natural persons as well as agents of corporate persons.  Lei No. 
9.605, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, art. 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
13.02.1998 (Braz.). 
 49. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 225 (Braz.); see also supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 225, caput (Braz.). 
11
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As such, the Constitution requires Brazil’s government to act in 
the realm of environmental protection.  Paragraph 1 of Article 
225 imposes several specific duties on the government, for 
example, constitutionalizing the need for an environmental 
impact study “for the installation of works and activities which 
may potentially cause significant degradation of the 
environment,” as well as a requirement to preserve “essential 
ecological processes” and to demarcate appropriate areas for 
special environmental protection.51 
Several other provisions in the Constitution mention the 
environment.  For example, Article 170 includes environmental 
protection as one of the principles upon which the country’s 
economic order is based, specifically allowing for differential 
treatment of goods and services based on their environmental 
impact.52  Article 186, in its list of conditions that rural property 
must meet in order to fulfill its “social function” (a concept related 
to agrarian land reform), requires the “adequate use of available 
natural resources and preservation of the environment.”53  This 
ecological function of property lays the foundation for the STJ’s 
important trend in emphasizing the preeminence of public rights, 
such as environmental rights, when they conflict with private 
property interests. 
The “greening” of Brazil’s Constitution certainly prioritizes 
and raises awareness of environmental issues in the country and 
provides a framework under which effective environmental 
conservation and natural resource management can take place, 
but as Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin has written, regulation 
is not a “mere theoretical exercise.”54  What has been done in 
Brazil to put this constitutional framework into effect?  Professor 
McAllister’s book describes how the Ministério Público, Brazil’s 
public prosecutors (federal and state), have inserted themselves 
 
 51. Id. art. 225, para. 1, cls. I, IV. 
 52. Id. art. 170, cl. VI. 
 53. Id. art. 186, cl. II.  Other provisions related to environmental protection 
include art. 5, cl. LXXIII; art. 20; art. 24, cls. VI–VIII; art. 129, caput, cl. III; art. 
174, para. 3; art. 200, cl. VIII; art. 216, caput, cl. V; art. 220, para. 3, cl. II; art. 
231, para. 1.  See also BELTRÃO, supra note 44, at 60-61. 
 54. Antônio Herman de Vasconcelos e Benjamin, A Implementação da 
Legislação Ambiental: O Papel do Ministério Público, 55 JUSTITIA 75, 76 (1993). 
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in the system of environmental protection.55  Article 129 of the 
Constitution lists bringing civil actions “to protect public and 
social property, the environment and other diffuse and collective 
interests” as one of the prosecutors’ functions.56  Prosecutors 
largely act independently from the three main branches of 
government in Brazil, and have authority to bring both criminal 
and civil actions before the courts.  They can play and have 
played a significant role by helping the public bring lawsuits 
against government agencies for failures in regulation or against 
private party polluters themselves.  But the judicialization of 
environmental protection – taking the cases to the courts – 
cannot happen without judges and courts that are capable and 
willing to take on environmental questions and disputes. 
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HIGH COURT OF 
BRAZIL (SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA) 
The STJ is one of a number of new institutions created in 
1988 by the new Brazilian Constitution.  The process of 
democratization and transition from over two decades of military 
government required reorganization to make the judicial branch 
more independent, effective, and accessible to Brazil’s citizens.  
At the same time, the immense backlog of cases before Brazil’s 
Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF), 
which had built up over decades, created a major obstacle to 
effective resolution of judicial disputes in the country. 
As a solution to these concerns, the STJ was created as a 
national court of last resort for infraconstitutional questions of 
federal law.  The goal of the Court is to standardize 
interpretation of federal law57 in order to reduce the caseload of 
the STF and reserve that court to deal primarily with 
constitutional questions.  The STJ has general jurisdiction, except 
in specialized subject areas of electoral, labor, and military law, 
which are reserved for their own respective Superior Courts.  It 
replaced (but with expanded jurisdiction) the pre-1988 Federal 
 
 55. See MCALLISTER, supra note 28. 
 56. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 129, caput, cl. III (Braz.). 
 57. See Missão, SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA, http://www.stj.jus.br/ 
portal_stj/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area=800 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
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Court of Appeals (Tribunal Federal de Recursos), which had been 
established by the last civilian constitution in 1947. 
The STJ’s composition and jurisdiction are laid out in the 
Constitution of 1988 in Articles 104 and 105, respectively.58  The 
court is composed of thirty-three Justices (ministros) and is 
specifically designed to represent different portions of the 
Brazilian legal community.  One-third is selected from judges of 
the five Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals (Tribunais Federais 
Regionais, or TRFs); one-third from state supreme courts; and 
one-third from among lawyers and public prosecutors (state and 
federal).59  When a vacancy occurs, the remaining STJ members 
vote to create a list of three names for each vacancy from which 
the President of Brazil must choose to make the appointment, 
which also requires a confirming majority vote in the Federal 
Senate.60  The STJ is presided over by a President and a Vice 
President, elected by the full body for two-year terms, rotating by 
seniority.61 
The STJ has several different types of jurisdiction, including 
original jurisdiction over specific cases as defined in Article 105.  
Most cases, however, come before the court as appeals – either 
from the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals (TRFs) or from state 
supreme courts (Tribunais de Justiça).  So-called “special 
appeals” (recursos especiais) – a common procedural mechanism 
in the court – come before the STJ when other courts differ in 
interpretation of a specific legal question, or when a state or 
federal court has rendered a decision or upheld a state/local law 
that allegedly conflicts with federal law.62 
As Brazil’s “Citizens’ Court” – a self-given nickname – the 
STJ is an important component of the country’s system that 
prioritizes access to justice.  All deliberations and decisions of the 
various organs with the STJ are video-recorded and available to 
 
 58. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] arts. 104, 105 (Braz.). 
 59. Id. art. 104, para. 1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA, REGIMENTO INTERNO, art. 2, §§ 2-3 (2011) 
[hereinafter STJ Internal Regulations], available at http://www.stj.jus.br/ 
publicacaoseriada/index.php/regimento. 
 62. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 105, para. 3, cls. 1-3. 
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the public either via television or Internet.63  But as a 
consequence of this ease of access, the STJ also handles and 
processes an enormous caseload.  Since the court began 
operations in 1989, it has reported over 3.7 million decisions; in 
2010 alone, the total was 330,283.64  To handle this docket, the 
STJ is administratively divided into sub-groups.  Five Justices 
make up a Panel (Turma), and two Panels (ten Justices) make up 
a Section (Seção).65  The three Sections have specific subject 
matter responsibilities: the First Section (which includes the 
First and Second Panels) deals with issues of public law, 
including taxation, education, urban planning, indigenous rights, 
agrarian reform, takings, social welfare law, and most matters of 
environmental law (excluding environmental crimes); the Second 
Section (Third and Fourth Panels) hears questions of private law, 
including matters of contracts, property, and family law, for 
example; and the Third Section (Fifth and Sixth Panels) is 
responsible for criminal law.66 
Each proceeding before the court is randomly assigned by an 
electronic system to an individual Justice (within the appropriate 
Section), who acts as the rapporteur (relator) for the case and 
prepares both a summary of issues presented in the case and a 
decision.67  The decision, along with an abstract (ementa) – which 
becomes an official part of the decision – is then circulated to the 
other Justices in the Panel.  In practice, the rapporteur can take 
responsibility to adjudicate less complex matters unilaterally 
(decisões monocráticas), subject to potential review by the Panel.  
If the case is complex, of particular importance, the rapporteur 
will submit the case to be discussed by the five Justices in a 
 
 63. See, e.g., Jurisprudência, SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA, 
http://www.stj.jus.br/SCON/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 64. SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA, BOLETIM ESTATÍSTICO [STATISTICAL 
BULLETIN] 31 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.stj.gov.br/webstj/ 
Processo/Boletim/Default.asp?ano=2011&submit=Ok. 
 65. STJ Internal Regulations, supra note 61, art. 2, § 4. 
 66. Id. art. 9.  The six Panels represent a total of thirty of the STJ’s Justices.  
The remaining three (who do not serve on Panels or in Sections) are the 
President, Vice President, and the General Coordinator of the Federal Judiciary, 
who has administrative responsibilities regarding the two lower levels of federal 
courts.  Id. art. 3. 
 67. Id. arts. 34, 68, 80. 
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session of the Panel.68  If necessary to ensure uniformity in 
deciding similar matters, the rapporteur may propose that the 
case be heard before the entire Section (a procedure known as 
afetação), or before the Special Court (Corte Especial), which is 
made up of the fifteen most senior Justices.69  Alternatively, 
parties may appeal to the full Section or the Special Court, as 
appropriate, when judgments issued by the Panels diverge from 
judgments of other Panels or Sections.70 
The nature of Brazilian federalism is partially responsible for 
the STJ’s caseload, as well as its significant responsibility in 
adjudicating issues of environmental law.  The Constitution of 
1988 formally allows for cooperative federalism, giving states 
overlapping authority to legislate in some subject areas, including 
environmental protection.71  In practice, however, the body of 
state legislation is quite small in comparison to federal law; there 
is, for example only one criminal code, one civil code, and one code 
of civil procedure used throughout the country.72  Environmental 
law is overwhelmingly federal law.  As a result, the role of the 
STJ in standardizing the interpretation of federal law in the 
country is critical in many fields of law, including environmental 
law. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH COURT OF BRAZIL’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The High Court of Brazil has positioned itself as a key actor 
in the interpretation and implementation of environmental law.  
The Court issued hundreds of decisions on environmental cases; 
this section includes only a select few on key issues, focusing on 
interpretation of Brazil’s Forest Code and the imposition of strict 
liability for environmental harms.  These decisions illustrate a 
trend toward interpretations that give stronger effect to 
 
 68. See id. arts. 148-68. 
 69. Id. art. 34, cl. XII. 
 70. Id. art. 266 (this is known as appealing for Embargos de Divergência). 
 71. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 24 (Braz.). 
 72. See CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] Decreto-Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 
(Braz.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002 (Braz.); 
CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] Lei No. 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973 
(Braz.). 
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constitutional and statutory provisions on environmental 
protection. 
A.  The Forest Code’s Day in Court: Giving Effect to 
Environmental Statutes 
The High Court of Brazil’s recent jurisprudence emphasizes a 
broad interpretation of a crucial piece of environmental 
legislation in Brazil – the Forest Code (Código Florestal).  The 
Forest Code is the foundation of Brazilian environmental law 
regarding the protection and maintenance of flora.  The Forest 
Code of 1965 institutes two key mechanisms for the protection of 
flora – the legal reserve (reserva legal), and the permanent 
preservation areas (áreas de preservação permanente, or APPs) – 
and includes many other provisions regulating the management 
and use of forests and other vegetation.73 
Although the current framework of the Forest Code dates 
back to the military dictatorship era, the STJ now interprets the 
law in light of the environmental provisions in the 1988 
Constitution.  Discussed below are two examples of how the STJ’s 
jurisprudence has developed to expand the application of the 
Forest Code.  First, the STJ has adopted a broad interpretation of 
the Code’s definition of permanent preservation areas, resisting 
efforts to loosen the law.  Second, despite earlier decisions to the 
contrary, the STJ now interprets the Forest Code’s prohibition on 
unauthorized burning to include cultivated vegetation, such as 
sugar cane, rather than only native vegetation.  These new 
precedents give greater effect to the Forest Code as a concrete 
implementation of environmental rights, placing public interests 
above private interests in natural resource management. 
1.  Protection of Riparian Vegetation 
Article 2 of the Forest Code describes various types of land 
that are considered “permanent preservation areas” (APPs), 
 
 73. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] arts. 2, 16, Lei No. 4771, de 
15 de Setembro de 1965 (Braz.), available at https://www.planalto.gov. 
br/ccivil_03/leis/l4771.htm.  Article 1 of the Forest Code describes the scope of 
the Code, extending not only to forests but to all “other forms of vegetation” as 
well.  Id. art. 1. 
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including riparian buffer zones, areas with steep inclines (greater 
than 45 degrees), and the tops of mountains and hills.74  
Although the Forest Code specifically protects vegetation, the 
emphasis on riparian buffers creates an important protection 
regime for aquatic ecosystems and ecological corridors.  As such, 
it constitutes an additional important element in Brazilian law 
regarding water resources.75 
The STJ decided a case in 2008 related to the Forest Code’s 
protection of riparian vegetation.76  The issue presented before 
the court was whether the width of a particular stream of water 
was relevant in determining the application of the Forest Code’s 
prohibition on clearing riparian vegetation.77 
The case involved a stream only seventy centimeters (slightly 
over two feet) wide.  The municipality of Joinville, in the southern 
state of Santa Catarina, had channeled the stream and cleared 
the surrounding Atlantic Forest vegetation to provide access to a 
new amphitheater and sports arena.78  The Federal Public 
Prosecutors’ office had brought the action against the 
municipality (and against two government agencies) for failure to 
comply with the Forest Code.  The court below, the Federal Court 
of Appeals (TRF) for the Fourth Circuit, noted the small size of 
the stream and held that “[t]he prohibition on clearing riparian 
vegetation in the Forest Code does not apply in this specific case, 
in this circumstance in which there is little or no environmental 
repercussion.”79 
The STJ’s Second Panel reversed the decision, in an opinion 
by Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin.  The Court began by 
quoting the relevant portion of the Forest Code: 
 
 74. Id. art. 2. 
 75. For a discussion of water resources law in Brazil, see Antonio Herman 
Benjamin et al., The Water Giant Awakes: An Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 2185 (2005). 
 76. S.T.J., REsp No. 176.753/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 07.02.2008 (Nov. 11, 2009) (Braz.). 
 77. Id. at 7-8. 
 78. Id. at 8. 
 79. Id. 
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Art. 2.  By the force of this law, forests and other natural 
vegetation located as listed below are categorized as permanent 
preservation areas: 
(a) the strip of land alongside a river or any body of water, from 
its highest level, with a minimum width of: 
(1) – 30 (thirty) meters for bodies of water less than 10 (ten) 
meters wide. . . .80 
The opinion continues with an explanation of the importance 
of riparian Permanent Preservation Areas: 
  The Federal Constitution supports essential ecological 
processes, among them riparian Permanent Preservation Areas.  
Their necessity is rooted in the ecological functions they perform, 
above all the conservation of soil and water.  Among these 
functions are: a) the protection of water quality and availability, 
by facilitating groundwater seepage and storage, by preserving 
the physicochemical integrity of bodies of water, from the 
headwaters to the mouth, as a plug and filter, and above all by 
slowing down erosion and sedimentary deposits and by blocking 
pollutants and debris, and b) the maintenance of wildlife habitats 
and the formation of biological corridors, increasingly valuable in 
the face of territorial fragmentation caused by human occupation. 
  . . . . 
  [That the vegetation cleared was within the riparian zone of 
the creeks in the area] is an incontrovertible fact that, moreover, 
cannot be questioned in a Special Appeal . . . .81 
By categorizing the riparian buffer as an “essential ecological 
process,” the Court links the Forest Code’s provision to a higher, 
constitutional norm.  Article 225 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees the right to an “ecologically balanced environment,” 
requires the Government to “preserve and restore the essential 
ecological processes” in order to ensure the right.82  With this 
constitutional backing, the Court reasoned that the Forest Code’s 
protection of riparian vegetation cannot be interpreted so 
 
 80. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] art. 2 Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de 
Setembro de 1965 (Braz.), available at https://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
ccivil_03/leis/l4771.htm (quoted in REsp No. 176.753/SC, at 6). 
 81. REsp No. 176.753/SC, at 6-7 (emphasis in original). 
 82. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 225, para. 1, cl. I (Braz.). 
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narrowly as to impede the Government from fulfilling its 
constitutional responsibility. 
Of course, one cannot know for sure the extent to which the 
constitutionalization of environmental norms in Brazil affects the 
outcome of this and other legal disputes.  It may be that the 
outcome of this particular case would be the same, given that the 
plain language of the statute clearly indicates the inclusion of 
riparian vegetation along any body of water.  After all, the 
question before the STJ was of interpretation of federal law, not 
the Constitution.  Nonetheless, it is easy to envision the counter 
argument, as espoused by the lower court, that applying the 
Forest Code to such a small stream would be an absurd result 
and inconsistent with the intent of the statute.  With the 
constitutional mandate to protect “essential ecological processes,” 
that argument becomes less plausible as the court views the 
statute in a new context, in furtherance of the constitutional goal. 
The Second Panel’s opinion turns to focus on the lower court’s 
holding, rejecting any distinction based on the small size of the 
body of water as an improper judicial creation: 
  [Such an] exception to the prohibition on clearing vegetation 
does not exist in the law, making its creation by judicial 
interpretation unviable.  The law, in cases such as this, only 
allows clearing in Permanent Preservation Areas when the party 
shows that the work, undertaking or activity is of “public utility” 
or “social interest” and, under this exception, obtains the 
necessary and proper authorization.  In this case, none of that 
occurred. 
  In reality, given that we are dealing with a body of water (a 
fact not in controversy), the only possible conclusion under the 
law . . . is that the strip of land 30 meters wide along its banks is 
of permanent preservation, any destruction of vegetation therein 
being absolutely prohibited. 
  It should be noted that at no point does the law condition the 
protection of bodies of water and of riparian vegetation based on 
their width, as the court below did.  Rather, the legislators’ 
decision in 1965 in favor of a fixed regime was intentional, 
designed precisely to be distinguished from a discretionary 
regime, which had characterized the 1934 Forest Code and 
resulted in its well-known failure. 
  . . . . 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
  
490 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
  [I]t is not the Judiciary’s role to extend the exceptions to the 
prohibition of deforestation, at the risk of weakening the system 
of environmental protection  delineated by the Constitution and 
prescribed by federal legislation.  Otherwise, a true Pandora’s 
box would be opened, in which each case would be treated 
independently, thus instituting, in the place of a 
nondiscretionary legal system of environmental administration, a 
new regime that, informally, eventually becomes discretionary, 
dependent on subtle judgments of convenience and opportunity 
by the administrator, case by case. 
  In sum, the legal protection of riparian Permanent 
Preservation Areas extends not only along the banks of “rivers,” 
but also along the edge of “any body of water” (Forest Code, art. 
2), thus including streams, currents, creeks, brooks, lakes, 
reservoirs – in short, all of the complex hydrological mosaic that 
makes up the river basin.  The legal regime of Permanent 
Preservation Areas is universal, both in the sense that it is 
applicable to all bodies of water in the nation’s territory, 
regardless of their flow or hydrological characteristics, and in 
that it includes banks still covered with vegetation . . . as well as 
those already cleared and that, as such, need to be restored. 
  It is not up to the judge to remove the legal requirements 
regarding the maintenance of riparian vegetation under the 
argument that we are dealing with a simple “rivulet,” reasoning 
that, taken to its logical conclusion, would end up making the 
protection of headwaters impractical as well.  More so than in 
large rivers, it is precisely in these small bodies of water that 
riparian vegetation fulfill a fundamental role of thermic 
stabilization, which is so important for aquatic life, due to its 
interception and absorption of solar radiation.  In short, great 
rivers cannot exist without their headwaters and diverse 
tributaries, even the smallest and narrowest, the width of which 
does not reduce its essential importance in maintaining the 
integrity of the system as a whole. 
  For these reasons, the possibility of clearing riparian 
vegetation based on the width of the water flow must be 
refuted.83 
The opinion is notable for its tone in framing the case as a 
simple literal (and ecological) interpretation of the plain language 
 
 83. REsp No. 176.753/SC, at 8-10. 
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in the statute.  Thus, the court’s focus is on refusing to loosen the 
law or expose itself to a slippery slope of judicial discretion 
regarding the application of the Forest Code.  This is in response 
to frequent criticism of environmental laws in Brazil as laws that 
fail to “stick” in the face of inertia and cultural resistance.84  
Justice Benjamin, prior to his appointment to the STJ, had 
written to this effect regarding the Forest Code: “while it was 
covered in mold on the shelf, the Code was [considered] a good 
law; once its instruments began even minimally to be used, it 
instantly became an overreaching law, incompatible with the 
needs of modern society.”85 
2.  Burning of Sugar Cane 
In addition to establishing and regulating legal forest 
reserves and permanent protection areas, the Forest Code 
prohibits the unauthorized burning of vegetation: “The burning of 
forests and other forms of vegetation is prohibited. . . . If specific 
local or regional conditions justify the use of fire in agropastoral 
or forest practices, permission shall be established by an act of 
the Government, specifying the permitted areas and establishing 
precautionary guidelines.”86  The STJ has, over the past decade, 
decided several cases regarding the application of this portion of 
the Forest Code to the burning of sugar cane straw.87 
Sugar cane has been a significant agricultural activity in 
Brazil since the 1500s.  In the 1970s, during the global oil crisis, 
the military-led national government began investing heavily in 
developing the sugar industry into the area of ethanol production 
 
 84. See, e.g., Crawford & Pignataro, supra note 27.  The issue of cultural 
resistance to environmental law is discussed infra Part IV. 
 85. Alex Fernandes Santiago, A Reserva Florestal Legal e o Superior Tribunal 
de Justiça: Levando um Direito a Sério, in DIREITO AMBIENTAL NO STJ, supra 
note 32, at 4 (quoting Antônio Herman V. Benjamin, A Proteção das Florestas 
Brasileiras: Ascensão e Queda do Código Florestal, 18 REVISTA DE DIREITO 
AMBIENTAL 23 (2000)). 
 86. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] art. 27, Lei No. 4771, de 15 
de Setembro de 1965 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
ccivil_03/leis/l4771.htm. 
 87. See Miryam Belle Moraes da Silva, Queima da Palha da Cana-de-Açúcar, 
in DIREITO AMBIENTAL NO STJ, supra note 32, at 215-37. 
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for fuel as well.88  Although the use of sugar cane ethanol has 
clear environmental benefits as an alternative to petroleum,89 
traditional sugar cane cultivation also creates significant 
environmental hazards.  Plantations typically engage in a 
controlled burning of the sugar cane straw prior to harvesting, 
clearing out animal and plant hazards to facilitate manual sugar 
cane collection for processing.  In 2006 alone, an estimated 2.5 
million hectares (nearly 10,000 square miles) of sugar cane was 
burned for this purpose in the state of São Paulo, which is 
responsible for over half of the country’s sugar cane production.90  
The burning not only releases greenhouse gases into the air, but 
also tremendous amount of ash and smoke, posing a health 
hazard for residents in the area.91 
Mechanization of sugar cane cultivation has developed as an 
economically feasible solution to the burning question.  Areas of 
sugar cane plantations that can be harvested by machine 
(possible so long as the slope of the plantation is not too steep) do 
not need to be burned.  However, mechanization creates a social 
issue; fewer laborers are required to operate and maintain the 
machines, resulting in the displacement a large number of 
manual sugar cane laborers. 
 
 88. See Decreto 76.593, de 14 de Novembro de 1975 (Braz.) (instituting the 
Brazilian Ethanol Program or Pro-Álcool). 
 89. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has classified sugar cane 
ethanol as an “advanced biofuel” for purposes of the United States’ Renewable 
Fuel Standards, determining that its use results in less than fifty percent of the 
greenhouse gas emissions of gasoline.  See OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT: EPA FINALIZES 
REGULATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM FOR 2010 
AND BEYOND (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/ 
420f10007.pdf.  Controversy still exists regarding the overall climate benefits of 
sugar cane ethanol, given the potential for indirect impacts on land use change 
elsewhere in Brazil.  See, e.g., David M. Lapola et al., Indirect Land-Use 
Changes can Overcome Carbon Savings from Biofuels in Brazil, 107 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 3388 (2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/02/ 
02/0907318107. 
 90. Thiago Reis, Queimada Cresce no País com Seca e Colheita da Cana, 
FOLHA.COM, Aug. 8, 2007, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ciencia/ 
ult306u319319.shtml. 
 91. See, e.g., Helena Ribeiro, Sugar Cane Burning in Brazil: Respiratory 
Health Effects, 42(2) REVISTA DE SAÚDE PÚBLICA 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rsp/v42n2/en_6804.pdf. 
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The federal government issued Decree 2.661 in 1998, which 
put the exception in Article 27 into effect, allowing for “controlled 
burning” only when the fire is used as a factor of production or 
management in agropastoral or forest activities, or for research 
purposes.92  Under the decree, the area to be burned must be 
specifically and previously defined, and the party must receive 
prior authorization from the appropriate entity within the 
National Environment System (SISNAMA).93  Article 16 of the 
decree specifically applies to the burning of sugar cane, providing 
for the gradual phasing-out of sugar cane burning on 
“mechanizable areas,” defined as any plantation with less than a 
twelve percent slope.94 
The first sugar cane burning case to arrive at the STJ was 
decided in 2002 by the First Panel.95  Justice José Delgado (now 
retired), writing for the majority, held that the prohibition in 
Article 27 of the Forest Code did not apply to burning sugar cane 
straw, but rather only to native vegetation.  In addition, Justice 
Delgado wrote in the summary of the opinion that 
“notwithstanding the damage caused by the burnings, this should 
be weighed against the economic and social harm that would 
accompany their prohibition, including unemployment for the 
rural workers that depend on [sugar cultivation] for their 
subsistence.”96  This opinion recognizes the tension between 
public and private interests in the interpretation of the Forest 
Code; the issue becomes whether it is acceptable to minimize a 
social problem (imminent labor displacement from increased 
mechanization of sugar cane harvesting) by perpetuating an 
environmental problem. 
The First Panel reiterated its interpretation that Article 27 
and Decree 2.661 permit the controlled burning of sugar cane 
 
 92. Decreto No 2.661, de 8 de Julho de 1998, art. 2 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2661.htm. 
 93. Id. arts. 2, 3. 
 94. Id. art. 16. 
 95. S.T.J., REsp No. 294.925/SP (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Milton Luiz 
Pereira, 03.10.2002 (Oct. 28, 2003) (Majority Opinion, Min. José Delgado); see 
also Moraes da Silva, supra note 87, at 225-26. 
 96. Id. at 1 (quoted in Moraes da Silva, supra note 87, at 225-26). 
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straw in another decision in 2006.97  Meanwhile, however, that 
same year, the Second Panel took a different approach, reading 
Article 27 to include cultivated vegetation.98  Justice João Otávio 
de Noronha’s opinion includes the following reasoning: 
  What has been sought, and I speak only of the legal aspect of 
the question, is to promote sustainable development, reconciling 
the productive sector’s interests with those of the people, which 
have the right to an ecologically balanced environment. 
  . . . . 
  The appellant would exclude [from Article 27 of the Forest 
Code] sugar cane plantations, on the theory that it covers only 
forests and native vegetation, not regularly cultivated crops. 
  However, the law’s reference to “other forms of vegetation” 
cannot be interpreted restrictively, but rather, it should be 
considered to include all forms of vegetation, whether permanent 
or regularly cultivated.  This is corroborated by the sole 
paragraph of [Article 27], which emphasizes the possibility of 
obtaining permission from the Government for the practice of 
burning in agropastoral activities, if regional circumstances so 
require. 
  [The opinion then quotes Decree 2.661/98, discussed above, 
and its requirement that the actor obtain “prior authorization” 
before engaging in controlled burning.] 
  As we see, the appellant was obligated to observe this 
restriction, which was not done, a fact that, unfortunately, seems 
to occur frequently in plantations throughout the country, despite 
the mandate for the gradual phasing out of the practice in Article 
16 of [Decree 2.661/98]. . . .99 
The Second Panel of the STJ in this case thus interpreted the 
Forest Code to prohibit sugar cane straw burning, unless 
previously approved by the relevant environmental agencies; 
however, Justice Otávio de Noronha concluded in the opinion that 
 
 97. S.T.J., REsp No. 345.971/SP (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Francisco Falcão, 
14.02.2006 (Mar. 6, 2006) (Braz.); Moraes da Silva, supra note 87, at 226. 
 98. S.T.J., REsp No. 439.456/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. João Otávio de 
Noronha, 03.08.2006 (Mar. 26, 2007) (Braz.). 
 99. Id. at 4-5. 
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monetary damages had not been proved with sufficient 
specificity.100 
Given these now-conflicting interpretations of the Forest 
Code, the full First Section (First and Second Panels) heard an 
appeal in 2010 on the same question.101  After noting the 
difference between the two Panels’ interpretations of Article 27, 
the Rapporteur, Justice Teori Albino Zavascki, wrote as follows: 
  The prohibition, as it can be seen, covers all forms of 
vegetation, including, therefore, cultivated crops, such as sugar 
cane produced within the scope of agricultural activity.  It does 
not follow that the [sugar cane] straw cannot be considered 
“vegetation.”  Effectively, we are not dealing with straw gathered 
in the field and transported to be burned in an oven or other 
equivalent equipment.  Rather, we are dealing with the burning 
of sugar cane straw in its natural habitat, throughout the 
plantation, and in this circumstance, it is like any other 
vegetation. 
  . . . . 
  It is further necessary to consider that “public and private 
business activities shall be exercised in accordance with the 
directives of the National Environmental Policy Act” (Law 
6.938/81, art. 5, sole paragraph), which policy includes, among 
other objectives, the “preservation and restoration of 
environmental resources to allow for rational use and permanent 
availability, contributing to the maintenance of a favorable 
ecological balance” (art. 4, VI), as well as the general principles of 
environmental law, such as the precautionary principle, the 
polluter-pays principle, and the principle of non-regression.  
Along this line is the grave warning given by Justice [Antonio] 
Herman Benjamin [in another decision published in 2009], which 
contributes to the conclusion in this case, in regard to the 
exceptional nature of the burnings: 
. . . Burning, above all in agro-industrial or organized, 
commercial agricultural activities, is incompatible with the 
objectives of environmental protection established in the 
Federal Constitution and in infraconstitutional 
 
 100. Id. at 5-6. 
 101. S.T.J., REsp No. 418.565/SP (1st Section), Relator: Min. Teori Albino 
Zavascki, 29.09.2010 (Oct. 13, 2010) (Braz.). 
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environmental norms.  In an era of climate change, any 
exception to this general prohibition [of burning vegetation], 
other than that prescribed expressly by federal law, should be 
interpreted narrowly by administrators and judges.102 
Both this opinion and the previously cited opinion by Justice 
Delgado103 deal with the same question: how to balance the 
environmental concern with the socioeconomic concern.  Yet the 
attitude is entirely different; with this last quote from Justice 
Benjamin, the STJ emphasizes that the environmental concerns 
are paramount. 
These two examples – protection of riparian vegetation and 
control of sugar cane burning – demonstrate the STJ’s move to 
interpret the Forest Code so as to allow for broader 
environmental protection.  The inclusion of small streams for the 
purpose of expanding riparian buffer protection, together with the 
inclusion of sugar cane as vegetation covered by the Forest Code, 
shows how the judicial branch can play a critical role in shaping 
and giving effect to environmental law. 
B.  Strict Civil Liability for Environmental Damage 
Even with strong environmental laws and courts that are 
willing to interpret those laws so as to give them maximum effect, 
the rights and interests those laws promote are often difficult to 
litigate or demonstrate.  Claims involving environmental 
interests – specifically, claims of environmental damage – 
frequently encounter problems related to proving the existence 
and scope of the damage, identifying the responsible party, and 
showing causation – the link between the defendant and the 
damage. 
The STJ has, through its jurisprudence, developed 
innovations to address many common challenges to the 
imposition of civil liability for environmental harms.  Most 
importantly, the Court has employed Brazilian law to impose 
strict liability (responsabilidade objetiva) – liability regardless of 
 
 102. Id. at 6-8 (quoting S.T.J., REsp No. 1.000.731/RO (2d Panel), Relator: 
Min. Antonio Herman Benjamin, 25.08.2009 (Sept. 8, 2009) (Braz.)). 
 103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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any showing of intent or negligence – for environmental damage.  
Under such a system, there need only be demonstrated the 
existence of environmental damage and a causal link that 
connects the defendant’s conduct to the damage.  Strict liability 
for environmental damage is rooted in the “Polluter-Pays” 
Principle, well-established in international environmental law 
and in many domestic environmental law systems, based on the 
idea that, when environmental damage has occurred, the polluter 
should be made to internalize the costs.104  In Brazil, this system 
is derived both from the Civil Code as well as the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1981.105  The STJ described this 
legal foundation in an opinion written by Justice Luiz Fux in 
2007: 
  Article 927, sole paragraph, of the [Brazilian Civil Code] of 
2002 provides: “[t]here shall be an obligation to repair the harm, 
independent of fault, as specified by law, or when the activity, as 
normally carried out by the actor who causes the harm, implies, 
by its nature, risk to the rights of others.”  As for the first part, in 
environmental law, we have the [National Environmental Policy 
Act], which instituted strict liability.  As for the second part, 
when confronted with hazardous activities for which the liability 
regime has not been specified by law, the judge may analyze it on 
a case-by-case basis . . . .  In this concept of risk, the principles of 
precaution, prevention, and reparation apply. 
  This is recognized by the force of positive law and, also, by a 
principle of natural law, for it is unjust to harm others or oneself.  
[Strict liability] facilitates proof of liability, without requiring a 
showing of intent, imprudence, or negligence, in order to protect 
goods that are of great interest to all and to which damage or 
 
 104. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on the Environment, Principle 16, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992); Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), Recommendation of the Council on Guiding 
Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, Council Document No. C (72)128 (May 1972), available at 
http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-574/008-574.html; Sanford E. Gaines, The 
Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 463, 466 (1991); RODRIGUES, supra note 34, at 29-37. 
 105. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 927 (Braz.); Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 
1981, art. 14, § 1 (Braz.). 
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destruction will have consequences not only for the present 
generation, but for future generations as well.106 
The relevant portion of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, found in Article 14, reads as follows: 
Paragraph 1 – Without impeding the application of penalties 
described in this article, the polluter is obligated, regardless of 
the existence of fault, to compensate or provide reparations for 
damage caused to the environment or to third parties, affected by 
his or her activity.  The Federal and State Public Prosecutors 
shall have authority to bring an action of civil or criminal 
liability for damage caused to the environment.107 
The STJ has, through its jurisprudence, taken strong, 
environmentally conscious positions in order to effectuate this 
strict liability system.  This was not inevitable, Justice Benjamin 
argues: judges could have thwarted the strict liability regime, 
given its revolutionary nature when it was adopted in 1981.108  
The decisions discussed below focus on three key issues in the 
implementation of strict environmental liability: first, how to 
determine the existence of environmental harm; second, what 
actions may be considered grounds for liability, whether as 
proximate causes of damage or otherwise, including situations 
where multiple private parties or state actors are involved; and 
third, whether there are limits on what types of remedies are 
available when environmental harm has occurred.  These topics 
and cases, as presented below, are by no means an exhaustive 
list, but represent a spectrum of examples in which the STJ has 
acted to hold polluters and degraders of natural resources strictly 
liable for environmental harm. 
 
 
 
 106. S.T.J., REsp No. 745.363/PR (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, 
20.09.2007 (Oct. 18, 2007), at 15 (Braz.) (quoting PAULO AFFONSO LEME 
MACHADO, DIREITO AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO 326-27 (12th ed. 2004)). 
 107. Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 14 § 1 (Braz.). 
 108. Interview with Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin, Superior Tribunal de 
Justiça, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 2011) (on file with author). 
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1.  Determining the Occurrence of Environmental 
Damage 
As noted above, Article 14 of the LPNMA imposes strict 
liability on “polluters” for environmental damage they cause, 
regardless of fault or negligence.109  Earlier in the statue, a 
“polluter” is defined as “a person or legal entity, public or private, 
that is responsible, directly or indirectly, for an activity that 
causes environmental degradation.”110  This definition thus 
delineates the two key issues in order to apply strict liability in 
Brazil: first, a showing that some environmental harm has 
occurred; and second, a determination that a defendant engage in 
some activity, whether by commission or omission, that caused, 
directly or indirectly, the harm.  Whether the environment has 
been “damaged,” and whether a particular activity can be said to 
cause that damage, depends also on cultural perceptions 
regarding natural resource use.  As such, the STJ plays an 
important role in challenging traditional notions of how humans 
should interact with the environment. 
a. Environmental Damage in Already Degraded 
Areas: Challenging Cultural Perceptions 
One potentially difficult issue for courts to resolve is whether, 
for liability purposes, environmental damage can occur in areas 
that are already degraded or less than pristine.  The Second 
Panel’s decision on a case involving the protection of mangrove 
swamps is a key example of how the STJ has interpreted and 
applied the notion of environmental harm.111  The Federal Public 
Prosecutor had brought the case against the defendants for filling 
in and draining a mangrove swamp.112  Below, both the federal 
trial court and Court of Appeals (TRF) for the Fourth Circuit had 
ruled against the defendants, ordering them to “a) remove the fill 
dirt and buildings on top of the mangrove swamp, and b) reforest 
 
 109. Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 14, § 1 (Braz.). 
 110. Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 3, cl. IV (Braz.). 
 111. S.T.J., REsp No. 650.728 (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 
23.10.2007 (Dec. 2, 2009) (Braz.). 
 112. Id. at 7. 
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the area with vegetation characteristic of mangrove swamps.”113  
The Court’s opinion discusses the nature of mangrove swamps 
and wetlands and the appropriate legal regime for their 
protection.  Justice Benjamin first provides the definition of 
mangroves and compares historical views with a more recent 
understanding of their ecological value: 
  Under CONAMA [National Environment Council] Resolution 
303/02, a mangrove swamp is “a lowland coastal ecosystem, 
subject to tidal flows, formed by muddy or sandy deposits, 
predominantly associated with natural vegetation known as 
mangroves, with fluvial-marine influence, common in muddy 
soils of estuary regions, present along the Brazilian coast, from 
the states of Amapá to Santa Catarina” (art. 2, inciso IX). 
  . . . . 
  Notwithstanding their important position as transitional 
ecosystems among land, river, and marine environments, 
mangroves, in the broad sense (including mangrove swamps, 
strictly speaking, and salt marshes), were wrongly undervalued, 
both popularly and legally.  As a result, a distorted cultural 
concept prevailed among us for centuries, one that viewed 
mangroves as the quintessential example of what is unsightly, 
fetid, and unhealthy – a sort of ugly duckling of ecosystems, or 
the antithesis of the Garden of Eden.  They were considered 
unproductive, no-man’s lands, associated with the procreation of 
mosquitoes that transmit serious diseases like malaria and 
yellow fever.  They were held in social disregard as well, as 
wastelands, with the humblest of occupants living in stilt houses, 
synonymous with poverty, filth, and social pariahs (areas of 
prostitution and illicit activity). 
  Eliminating mangroves, especially urban ones during 
epidemics, was considered to be a favor done by private parties 
and a duty of the State, a perception incorporated simultaneously 
in public sentiment and in sanitation laws enacted by 
governments of various levels.  Under this paradigm, the enemy 
of the mangrove became the benefactor, the modernizer, 
encouraged by the Government and treated leniently by the 
Judiciary.  If in the service of civilized urbanization, purifying 
and cleansing the body and spirit, and reclaiming the landscape, 
no one would impede the action of those held up socially as 
 
 113. Id. 
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participating in a noble cause.  The destruction of the mangrove 
was imposed, then, as the recovery of and a cure for an anomaly 
of Nature, converting a natural aberration – through 
humanizing, cleansing and expunging its ecological 
characteristics – into a Garden of Eden of which it had never 
been part. 
  Due to the evolution of scientific understanding and changes 
in humans’ ethical posture before Nature, we now recognize in 
mangrove swamps various functions: a) ecological functions, as 
the sea’s nursery, a central piece in the reproductive process of a 
great number of species, a biological filter that retain nutrients, 
sediments and even pollutants, a buffer zone against storms, and 
a barrier against coastal erosion; b) economic functions (source of 
food and traditional activities, such as artisanal fishing); c) social 
functions (vital environment for traditional populations, whose 
survival depends on the use of crustaceans, molluscs, and fish 
found therein).114 
The opinion continues, describing developments in Brazilian law 
toward the protection of mangroves: 
  Current Brazilian legislation reflects the scientific, ethical, 
political, and legal transformation that has repositioned 
mangrove swamps, raising them from the level of undesirable 
health risk to that of critically threatened ecosystem.  Seeking to 
preserve their ecological, economic and social functions, the 
Legislature classified them legally as Permanent Preservation 
Areas (APP). 
  In these terms, it is the duty of all, whether owners or not, to 
look after the preservation of mangrove swamps, which is 
increasingly necessary, especially in a time of climate change and 
rising sea levels.  Destroying them for direct economic use, under 
the ever-present incentive of easy profits and short-term benefits, 
draining them or filling them for real estate speculation or soil 
use, or transforming them into landfills are grave offenses to an 
ecologically balanced environment and to the well-being of 
society, behavior that must be quickly and strongly controlled 
and sanctioned by the Administration and by the Judiciary.115 
 
 114. Id. at 10-11. 
 115. Id. at 11-12. 
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How to characterize whether damage has occurred, in the 
context of historically entrenched cultural perspectives regarding 
coastal and wetland ecosystems, is a crucial issue here and a key 
contribution of this case.  Under the LPNMA and the 
Constitution of 1988, the law had changed, shifting toward a 
great valuation of mangroves.  Yet this vision had not yet been 
internalized by the defendant, which argued before the Court: 
  There was no destruction of the mangrove in the work of 
filling and grading because the mangrove had already been 
exterminated by the proven acts of third parties, corroborated by 
the constant dumping of trash on the site over many years, until 
the area was acquired by the Appellants, who, through the 
construction on the site, sought to avoid the contamination and 
destruction of the rest of the area surrounding the trash 
dump.116 
Can the property owner be held responsible for the damage 
caused by third parties in using the mangrove as a trash dump?  
If the trash dump is already in place, does filling the mangrove 
constitute “damage?”  How can a court resolve these questions 
without incentivizing the owner’s willingness to turn a blind eye 
to others’ actions? 
As to whether the degraded condition of the mangrove 
swamp, having been used as a trash dump, justifies, exempts, or 
mitigates the nature of filling the swamp as “pollution,” the Court 
responded: 
  Throughout this case, the defendants argued that “the 
restitution of the destroyed environment to the status quo ante, 
the recomposition of virgin nature, through the excavation and 
removal of thousands of tons of putrid and contaminated trash, is 
an inconceivable remedial measure” [citation omitted].  And that 
“it is as legally inconceivable as it is economically absurd to 
require the legitimate owner of the property to destroy the 
additions thereon, in order to exhume the soil of the dead 
mangrove buried under a thick layer of trash” [citation omitted]. 
  Yet what is inconceivable is, after the Federal Constitution of 
1988, which placed high value on the preservation of “essential 
 
 116. Id. at 12. 
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ecological processes” (art. 225, § 1º, inciso I), and in open 
disrespect to the Forest Code of 1965, to attempt to give the 
mangrove swamp any finality other than that consistent with the 
untouchability that the law attributes to it as a Permanent 
Preservation Area.  And, in the absence of clear public utility or 
social interest, denaturing it so as to illegally and unilaterally 
appropriate it and use it for individual ends, removing it from 
public use and from future generations.  If it were chattel, under 
criminal law, such would be considered theft.  Being real 
property, what is it then? 
  . . . . 
  It cannot be argued that one environmental problem 
(depositing domestic and industrial trash) can be resolved by 
creating a different environmental problem (filling the mangrove 
swamp).  Obligations derived from the illegal dumping of trash or 
waste on the soil are of a propter rem nature, which means that 
they adhere to the title and are transferred to future owners, 
even more so if the illegal act benefits or increases the value of 
the land, setting aside any debate about good or bad faith of the 
acquirer, given that subjective liability, based on fault or 
negligence, does not apply.117 
The Court’s conclusion that “one environmental problem . . . 
[cannot] be resolved by creating a different environmental 
problem” is an important point in considering what constitutes 
“damage.”  A subsequent case before the STJ, decided in 2009, 
also illustrates this point.  In that case, the Second Panel applied 
strict liability in the case, which involved a hotel that was built 
contrary to environmental zoning regulations, regardless of the 
supposed good faith of the builder, who had commenced 
construction with an environmental permit given inappropriately 
by a local agency in violation of state and municipal law.  The 
Court once again affirmed its ability to hold parties responsible 
when environmental damage occurs in a location that is already 
less than pristine: 
Finally, it is important to note that, under the principle of the 
amelioration of environmental quality, adopted in Brazilian law 
(heading to art. 2 of Law 6.938/81 [National Environmental 
Policy Act]), it is inconceivable to suggest that, if real property, 
 
 117. Id. at 13-14. 
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urban or rural, is located in a region already ecologically 
deteriorated or compromised by the acts or omissions of others, 
its preservation and future conservation (and especially its 
eventual restoration or recovery) are no longer necessary, an idea 
that would, indirectly, create an absurd canon of interpretation 
in favor of a supposed right to pollute and degrade: if others, with 
impunity, have contaminated, destroyed, or deforested the 
protected environment, let the privilege apply to and benefit 
all.118 
According to the STJ, then, strict environmental liability in 
Brazil must be seen as tool to accomplish the larger objectives of 
the LPNMA.  Given that the goal is the “preservation, 
amelioration, and recovery of environmental quality,”119 strict 
liability under the Act ought to be used to fulfill that goal; 
allowing for further environmental deterioration with impunity 
when some degradation has already occurred would frustrate this 
purpose. 
b. Moral Damages? 
Another issue in the ascertainment of whether 
environmental damage has occurred is the notion of “moral 
damages” (danos morais) – non-pecuniary damages for pain and 
suffering.  Given that environmental rights guaranteed in Brazil 
are diffuse and collective in nature, courts are not always willing 
to recognize moral damages as a harm that can be appropriately 
redressed in an environmental claim.  However, an amendment 
to the Public Civil Action Act in 1994 specifically provided that 
such actions may be brought for “liability for moral and pecuniary 
damages” to diffuse and collective interests, including to the 
environment.120 
The Court has not interpreted this provision broadly.  In the 
2006, the First Panel of the STJ, in a split 3 to 2 decision, denied 
 
 118. S.T.J., REsp No. 769.753/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 
08.09.2009 (June 10, 2011), at 16 (Braz.). 
 119. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, art. 2 (Braz.) (emphasis added). 
 120. Lei No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho de 1994, art. 88 (Braz.) (amending Lei No. 
7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, art. 1 (Braz.)). 
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moral damages in an environmental case.121  The trial court had 
ordered the Municipality of Uberlândia, in the State of Minas 
Gerais, along with a real estate developer, to pay moral damages 
in addition to other compensatory measures for environmental 
degradation caused during construction on certain plots of 
land.122  However, the three Justices in the majority vacated the 
award of moral damages, holding that such damages were 
incompatible with the collective nature of the injury.123  The 
majority allowed for moral damages in a case of environmental 
harm only when the harm was such that it affected the dignity of 
specific individuals, suggesting, as an example, a case in which a 
person is emotionally harmed by the cutting down of a special 
tree planted by her ancestor.124 
Three years later, against this precedent, the Second Panel 
issued a decision upholding collective moral damages, perhaps 
fitting into the First Panel’s suggested exception.125  The case 
involved illegal logging on land traditionally occupied by 
Ashaninka-Kampa indigenous peoples on the Brazil-Peru border.  
The STJ upheld the trial court’s judgment (restoration and 
compensatory damages), including 3 million reais (approximately 
$1.7 million) in moral damages for illegally cutting cedar and 
mahogany in the area from 1981 to 1987.126  Even under the First 
Panel’s reasoning, moral damages for environmental damage 
would mostly likely be considered appropriate here because of the 
people’s particular connection to that aspect of the environment 
that was destroyed. 
2.  Who is Responsible?  Causation and Other Grounds 
for Liability in Environmental Cases 
If environmental damage has occurred, the language of the 
LPNMA dictates that those responsible for causing it should be 
 
 121. S.T.J., REsp No. 598.281/MG (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, 
02.05.2006 June 1, 2006) (majority opinion, Min. Teori Albino Zavascki). 
 122. Id. at 6-7 (Min. Luiz Fux, dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 32 (majority opinion, Min. Teori Albino Zavascki). 
 124. Id. 
 125. S.T.J., REsp No. 1.120.117/AC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 
10.11.2009 (Nov. 19, 2009) (Braz.). 
 126. Id. at 16-18. 
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made to pay for recovery of the area.  In the mangrove swamps 
case cited above, the STJ’s opinion concludes: “Once the causal 
link has been established between the action and omission of the 
[defendants] and the environmental damage in question, the duty 
arises objectively to promote the recovery of the affected area and 
provide compensation for any remaining damage.”127 
a.  Broad Interpretation of Causation: Who 
Qualifies as a Polluter? 
The STJ has interpreted rules of causation broadly in 
environmental cases, which greatly increases the likelihood that 
some party will be held liable.  The Court has, however, had to 
defend this interpretation against arguments that causation, if 
applied too liberally, is too harsh on new landowners or in 
circumstances in which third parties have also contributed to the 
damage.  Also in the case on mangrove swamps, the Court 
addressed the defendants’ causation argument: 
Not knowing who deposited the trash does not absolve the 
property owner, which can – and should, as pointed out well in 
both lower courts’ judgments – be held responsible not only for 
that which she has done, but also by omission for failing to 
immediately notify authorities regarding the legal violation that, 
done by third parties, would end up benefitting her.  For purposes 
of determining causation in the case of environmental damage, 
the following have been grouped together as equivalent: who acts, 
who does not act when she should, who allows the action, who 
does not care that others act, who finances the action performed by 
others, and who benefits when others act.128 
In the Court’s judgment, not holding the owner responsible 
would create a perverse incentive, allowing property owners to 
circumvent the requirements of environmental laws to benefit 
economically from pollution on their land; thus, the inclusive list 
 
 127. S.T.J., REsp No. 650.728 (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 
23.10.2007) (Dec. 2, 2009), at 16 (Braz.). 
 128. Id. at 13-15 (emphasis added). 
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of parties that may be held jointly and severally liable for 
environmental damage.129 
As the case describes, once causation has been established, 
the duty (or liability) arises objectively; there need not be any 
intent to damage the environment or any showing of recklessness 
or negligence.  The fact of engaging in behavior that puts the 
environment at risk exposes the actor to liability for whatever 
may occur.  This serves two purposes: on the one hand, it 
effectively internalizes the negative costs that polluters exact on 
the environment and others around them; in addition, it may help 
act as a deterrent, encouraging actors to think twice before 
engaging in activities potentially hazardous to the 
environment.130  This latter point is critical because it is better to 
avoid environmental harm in the first place – the principle of 
prevention – than to attempt to clean up after the damage is 
done, which may be difficult or impossible to adequately or fully 
accomplish. 
b. Propter Rem Obligations Under the Forest Code: 
Redefining Causation 
The Forest Code, introduced above, is another example of 
how the STJ has broadly interpreted the notion of “causation” as 
an element of liability so as to give effectiveness to environmental 
laws, broadening their application both by applying modern 
ecological understanding and by reviving ancient concepts that 
date back to Roman law.  The Forest Code contains two key 
mechanisms for the protection of forests in Brazil.  Aside from the 
permanent preservation areas (APPs) examined above in regard 
to riparian vegetation, the Forest Code requires rural landowners 
to set aside a specified percentage of land as a legal forest reserve 
(reserva legal).131  This legal reserve must cover eighty percent of 
naturally forested properties in the Amazon region,132 thirty-five 
 
 129. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.C on joint and several liability in 
environmental cases. 
 130. See, e.g., RODRIGUES, supra note 34, at 29-31. 
 131. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] art. 16 (Braz.). 
 132. This requirement (and the following one) applies in “Legal Amazonia” 
(Amazônia Legal), which includes the states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, 
Rondônia, and Roraima, and parts of Mato Grosso, Tocantins, and Maranhão. 
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percent of savanna areas in Amazonian states, and twenty 
percent of rural areas in the rest of Brazil.133  While vegetation 
on the legal reserve cannot be cleared, landowners are permitted 
under the Forest Code to use the area for economic purposes, so 
long as it is done in accordance with sustainable forest use 
practices.134 
While this requirement has been law since 1965, it remains 
highly controversial, and compliance is far from uniform.135  In 
addition, there is a legal problem when a property has already 
been deforested and is then sold or transferred to a new owner.  If 
there is no liability, the statute loses much of its effect. 
Prior to 2000, the STJ had interpreted the Forest Code such 
that a current property owner could not be held liable for 
deforestation that occurred previously on the property, whether 
by failing to maintain a legal forest reserve or by clearing an area 
designated as a permanent preservation area.  These 
interpretations focused on the requirement of causation, 
concluding that a new owner, upon acquiring property already 
cleared of vegetation, could not be considered to have caused the 
violation.  Consider the following two quotations from cases 
involving liability under the Forest Code: 
Art. 14 § 1 of [the National Environmental Policy Act] provides 
that a polluter is obliged, regardless of any finding of fault, to 
compensate or provide reparations for damage caused to the 
environment or to third parties affected by his activity, but it 
requires a causal link between the conduct of the [actor] and the 
damage . . . . 136 
 
Amazônia Legal, CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS (July 7, 2005), 
http://www2.camara.gov.br/agencia/noticias/70447.html. 
 133. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] art. 16, cls. I-IV (Braz.). 
 134. Id. art. 16, §§ 2-3.  For example, landowners may introduce non-native 
fruit tree species for economic use, so long as this is done sustainably. 
 135. The legal reserve requirement is one of the major elements of the debate 
in reforming the Forest Code.  The bill that the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil’s 
lower house of Congress) passed in May 2011 would reduce and create 
additional exemptions to the required legal reserve area.  See, e.g., Votação do 
Código Florestal Fica para Próxima Terça, Diz Líder do Senado, GLOBO.COM 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2011/11/votacao-do-codigo-
florestal-no-senado-sera-na-terca-diz-lider.html. 
 136. S.T.J., REsp No. 218.120/PR (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Garcia Vieira, 
24.08.1999 (Oct. 11, 1999), at 4 (Braz.). 
39
  
2012] BRAZIL’S GREEN COURT 509 
 
 
Even though independent of a finding of fault, liability for 
environmental damage requires a showing of a causal link 
between the conduct and the harm.137 
In 2000, the First Panel of the STJ began to shift its position.  
An NGO, the Environmental Defense and Education Association 
of Maringá (ADEAM in Portuguese), had brought a suit against a 
rural landowner in the state of Paraná in southern Brazil, 
seeking to enforce the legal reserve requirement in Article 16 of 
the Forest Code.138 Justice José Delgado, rapporteur for the case, 
described the issue as follows: 
The main controversy is whether the new owner may legitimately 
be considered a defendant in order to answer for environmental 
damages, with the “obligation, under the Forest Law that 
prescribes a reserve on 20% of a rural property, to regenerate the 
previously existing forest, discontinuing the use of the area for 
the cultivation of grains or for pastures, and the official 
demarcation of the area on the real estate record.”139 
Ultimately, this decision was procedural, only dealing with who 
could properly be sued in the case; however, it opened a crack in 
the previous precedents.  The State Supreme Court had held that 
the government would need to act – and compensate the 
landowner for diminished economic use – in order to require a 
new owner to reforest an area that had already been cut in order 
to create the legal reserve.140  The court interpreted the Forest 
Code as lacking any requirement that the property owner 
undertake the reforestation at her own cost.141 
 
 137. S.T.J., REsp No. 214.714/PR (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Garcia Vieira, 
17.08.1999 (Sept. 27, 1999), at 3 (Braz.). 
 138. S.T.J., REsp No. 222.349/PR (1st Panel), Relator: Min. José Delgado, 
23.03.2000 (May 2, 2000), at 1 (Braz.).  ADEAM’s widespread legal action 
seeking to enforce the legal reserve requirement on new property owners is the 
reason why most of the cases that discuss the subject originated in the southern 
state of Paraná (PR).  See Santiago, supra note 85, at 9. 
 139. REsp No. 222.349/PR, supra note 138, at 6-7. 
 140. Id. at 5. 
 141. Id. 
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In summarizing the record below of the case, Justice José 
Delgado quoted at length from the State Public Prosecutors’ 
office, which argued that the court below had misunderstood the 
nature of the legal reserve requirement.  Rather than depending 
on the whim of the state to define the area or impose on the state 
the obligation to compensate property owners for creating a 
reserve, the law should be interpreted so as to serve conservation 
goals: “[a]cquisition [of the property] does not alter the new 
owner’s duty to maintain the legal reserve, because by the force of 
the law, this duty already existed prior to the act of purchasing 
the property, and by acquiring the property, the new owner 
assumes all of the appurtenant burdens.”142  In other words, the 
duty under the Forest Code is tied to the property, regardless of 
the owner, making the legal reserve a propter rem obligation – an 
obligation “because of the thing.”  The prosecutor envisioned 
clearly the consequences associated with the opposing view: if the 
new owner had no responsibility to maintain forested land where 
such had already been cleared, the purpose of the law would be 
quickly and easily frustrated.143 
While Justice Delgado’s opinion did not continue to discuss 
the merits of the case, the simple ruling was clear: it is at least 
possible procedurally to bring an action against a new property 
owner in such cases when the Forest Code’s requirements had 
been previously neglected.144  Thus, “causing” environmental 
degradation is redefined to include acquiring land not in 
compliance with the Forest Code. 
Since 2000, numerous STJ precedents have held that Forest 
Code obligations, including to duty to maintain and officially 
register a legal forest reserve, apply to new owners as propter rem 
obligations.145  See, for example, the following excerpt from a 
2007 decision by Justice Benjamin, writing for the Second Panel: 
 
 142. Id. at 3. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 9. 
 145. See, e.g., S.T.J., REsp 2009, 1.058.222/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. 
Antonio Herman Benjamin, 03.09.2009 (May 4, 2011) (Braz.) (discussing 
registration of legal reserve). 
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  [W]hoever acquires real property that has been deforested 
illegally, or in discord with environmental legislation, receives it 
with not only its positive attributes and improvements, but also 
with the applicable environmental burdens, including the duty to 
recover native vegetation in the Legal Reserve and in Permanent 
Preservation Areas, as well as the responsibility to register [the 
legal reserve] with the Real Estate Office. 
  Permanent Preservation Areas (APPs) and Legal Reserves 
empower and give practical effect to the ecological function of 
property (arts. 170, VI, 186, II, and 225 of the Federal 
Constitution) . . . .  Preserving what remains, but also defending 
what should naturally be found, is the object of the legislation.  
Therein is the duty to recover the environment that has been 
degraded. 
  In the infraconstitutional legal order, APPs and Legal 
Reserves represent the central pillars of in situ flora conservation 
in Brasil, founded in the Forest Code and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (Law 6.938/81).  They are generic 
requirements, derived directly from the law.  In this light, they 
are intrinsic elements or internal limits of the rights of property 
and possession. 
  Consequently, obligations thus derived are of a clear propter 
rem (because of the thing) nature, that is, they adhere to the 
titleholder and are passed to new owners ad infinitum, 
regardless of any express or tacit manifestation of acceptance.  If 
ownership of the thing changes, the holder of the duty changes 
automatically also, whether or not any such contractual clause 
exists . . . .  Strictly speaking, there can be no discussion of fault 
or causation when a judge requires the new owner . . . to 
undertake actions (registry, recovery with native species and 
protection of these areas) or refrain from others (refrain from 
direct economic use – in the case of APPs – and clear cutting, 
given that only selective cutting is permitted, in Legal Reserves). 
  As to this key point, the decision below is in accordance with 
the STJ’s jurisprudence, which applies strict civil liability in 
similar cases, in ordering that new owners regrow and protect 
the forest cover in the area, even if they did not themselves 
undertake any earlier deforestation, of even if they were unaware 
of the requirement’s existence. 
  Whoever benefits from, aggravates, or continues 
environmental degradation caused by others is no less a cause of 
degradation.  For this reason, the law charges the new owner 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
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with the responsibility to repair the misdeeds of his predecessor.  
This holds for deforestation, water pollution and soil erosion.146 
The key use of the STJ’s categorization of Forest Code obligations 
as propter rem, deriving from the ownership of the property, is as 
a backstop when causation may otherwise be difficult to prove in 
cases of environmental degradation.  In the words of Justice 
Franciulli Netto (now deceased): 
  There can be no discussion of lack of causation, for he who 
perpetuates the damage to the environment, committed by 
others, is himself engaging in illegal conduct. 
  Even if it were not so, if maintaining a permanent 
preservation area is a propter rem obligation, or in other words, 
derived from the relationship between the owner and the object, 
the obligation of conservation is transferred from the seller to the 
purchaser, regardless of whether the latter is responsible for the 
environmental damage.147 
Thus, no landowner is exempt from the Forest Code 
requirements; there is no grandfathering in of previously cleared 
land, and no shield when landowners allow third parties to cause 
environmental damage, as seen in the mangrove case above.148  
Those interested in purchasing rural property must then ensure 
that the requirements are met, or negotiate an adjustment in 
price to reflect that the new owner will bear the cost of recovering 
the forest. 
The imposition of strict liability in U.S. law for hazardous 
waste release under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)149 provides 
a useful analogy to the propter rem obligations under the Forest 
Code.  Specific provisions in CERCLA are designed to accomplish 
a similar result for hazardous waste cleanup.  CERCLA’s system 
of “potentially responsible parties” allows the federal government 
to bring suits against a variety of parties in order to seek 
 
 146. S.T.J., REsp No. 2007. 948.921/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio 
Herman Benjamin, 23.10.2007 (Nov. 11, 2009), at 10-11 (Braz.). 
 147. S.T.J., REsp No. 343.741/PR (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Franciulli Netto, 
07.10.2002 (Oct. 7, 2002), at 9 (Braz.). 
 148. See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601—9675 (2006). 
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compensation for cleanup efforts.150  When the federal 
government undertakes to clean up a hazardous site, current 
property owners may be held accountable under the statute – 
regardless of whether they in any way contributed to the 
hazardous waste disposal – along with prior owners, those who 
arrange for waste disposal, and those who transport it.151 
c. Joint and Several Liability 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act’s definition of 
“polluter” – ”a person or legal entity, public or private, that is 
responsible, directly or indirectly, for an activity that causes 
environmental degradation”152 – there will clearly be incidences 
when more than one actor may be considered a “polluter.”  In 
such circumstances, the STJ’s legal approach is to apply the 
Brazilian Civil Code’s provision regarding joint and several 
liability (responsabilidade solidária).153  In a case involving 
illegal occupation and construction in a state park in the state of 
São Paulo, the Court described an important factor that affects 
how liability is apportioned: the indivisibility of environmental 
rights. 
  [T]he ecologically balanced environment, as an intangible 
reality and a common asset belonging to the people, essential to 
their quality of life, is indivisible in nature, notwithstanding the 
concrete manifestations associated with its physical elements 
(soil, air, water, forests, animal life, etc.). . . . [T]his judicially 
recognized asset cannot be fragmented, as it consists of . . . the 
“set of physical, chemical and biological conditions, laws, 
influences and interactions that permit, shelter and regulate life 
in all its forms” (art. 3, I, of Law 6.938/81).154 
 
 150. Id. § 9607(a). 
 151. Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
 152. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 Agosto de 1981, art. 3, IV (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6938.htm. 
 153. The Civil Code explains the obligations of co-liable parties under joint 
and several liability in Articles 275 to 285.  CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] arts. 275–85. 
 154. S.T.J., REsp No. 1.071.741/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 24.03.2009 (Dec. 16, 2010), at 24 (Braz.). 
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The Court then continued with an explanation of how joint and 
several liability functions to facilitate the implementation of 
environmental laws: 
  [J]oint and several liability is one of the most traditional and 
undisputed hallmarks of the Brazilian environmental civil 
liability regime. 
  As a technique that seeks to enable reparation for the victim, 
joint and several liability functions simultaneously as a 
guarantee of the liable parties’ solvency and as a tool to facilitate 
access to justice.  It is an exception to the rule that the liable 
party is not responsible for paying any more than is owed as a 
result of his individual action or omissions (the standard method 
for apportioning co-liability, in accordance with each party’s 
contribution to the damage) . . . . 
  . . . . 
  Joint and several liability among defendants is legally 
appropriate when three conditions are met, which all apply in 
Environmental Law: a shared legal situation among the liable 
parties, which creates among them a common link; the necessity 
or propriety of more strongly condemning the conduct practiced 
by the parties; [and] concerns related to guaranteeing solvency 
(citation omitted).  Therefore, the dual function, noted above: 
better guaranteeing the availability of credit [to meet the parties’ 
liability] and facilitating access to justice. 
  Solvency is better guaranteed under the legal grouping 
mechanism specific to joint and several liability, as it makes each 
defendant liable in totum et totaliter, or in other words, as it 
makes the entirety of various assets available toward 
reparations, allowing the plaintiff to choose, as she deems 
appropriate, one, some, or all of them, removing, in this way, the 
benefit of dividing [the liability] (beneficium divisionis). 
  Access to justice is facilitated by dispensing with, for 
procedural convenience, the need to have all co-liable parties 
present in the procedure, which may not always be easy or 
practicable, whether in identifying or locating the defendants, or 
in proving, individually, the role of each in causing [the damage].  
In this regard, it is often said that one of the purposes of joint 
and several liability is precisely to avoid buck-passing between 
polluters that, if not for this legal remedy, would insult the 
judicial order by creating “absolute impunity for those 
responsible, each one denying that its action caused or 
contributed to the damage” (citation omitted). 
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  In various countries and legal systems in the world, the pure 
procedural convenience, as well as the difficulty of determining 
certain questions of fact, such as the individual identification of 
each portion of the damage that each entity is responsible for 
causing, make joint and several liability a “necessity” (citation 
omitted).  A necessity in ordinary Law of Obligations; absolutely 
indispensable in Environmental Law.155 
According to the STJ, joint and several liability is closely linked 
to and inherent in the type of lawsuit – the public civil action 
(ação civil pública) – frequently employed in environmental 
cases.156  As such, it is an important mechanism in administering 
civil liability for environmental damage. 
As another example, the STJ applied joint and several 
liability in a major case involving coal mining operations in the 
state of Santa Catarina.157  The dispute arose out of severe 
environmental damage in an area covering seven 
municipalities.158  Before the STJ, the mining companies argued 
that the lower court’s application of joint and several liability was 
inappropriate, given that the companies did not all operate in all 
of the polluted area.159  Justice João Otávio de Noronha, 
rapporteur for the case, made reference to the federal trial court’s 
decision, affirming the applicability of the doctrine: 
  At the trial court, this question was decided, with the judge 
adopting the theory that the pollution was one whole, as 
indicated in the following excerpt: 
It was previously agreed that joint and several liability 
applies for environmental damage [in this case], but this joint 
and several liability is limited by the form of the damage and 
the associated duty to provide compensation.  The damage 
 
 155. Id. at 24-26. 
 156. See S.T.J., REsp No. 18.567/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 
16.06.2000 (Oct. 2, 2000), at 4 (Braz.). 
 157. S.T.J., REsp No. 647.493/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. João Otávio de 
Noronha, 22.05.2007 (Oct. 22, 2007) (Braz.).  For more background on this case, 
see Annelise Monteiro Steigleder, Dano Ambiental e sua Reparação: Comentário 
ao Recurso Especial no. 647.493/SC, in DIREITO AMBIENTAL NO STJ, supra note 
32, at 51-64. 
 158. REsp No. 647.493/SC, at 8-9, 20. 
 159. Id. at 19. 
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caused to the air, land, and water in the coal-mining region is 
one whole, and affects the entire ecosystem.  Although this 
damage has occurred over a long period of time, it is one 
whole, indivisible, and it was principally caused by mining.  It 
is known that this degradation occurred as a direct result of 
mining activity, but it is unknown exactly which one polluted 
the most” (citation omitted). 
In fact, under this line of reasoning, the applicability of joint and 
several liability is perfectly appropriate, . . . [according to] art. 
942 of the [2002 Civil Code], which reads as follows: 
Art. 942.  Possessions belonging to a person liable for an 
offense or violation of the rights of others are subject to 
reparations for the damage caused; and if the offense is 
caused by more than one person, all shall be held jointly and 
severally liable to provide reparations.160 
However, even though joint and several liability would apply, the 
STJ determined to limit its application and modified the 
judgment from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals below: 
  [G]iven that there is more than one entity that caused the 
same damage, all should be held liable jointly and severally for 
the recovery of the environment.  However, if the polluters are 
different, even though the pollution is identical, but perpetrated 
in distinct places, joint and several liability cannot be attributed, 
due to the lack of a causal link between the demonstrated 
damage in a specific location and the polluter in a different 
location, except, of course, for cases of indivisible damage as a 
whole, as in, for example, the pollution of water, subsoil 
resources, and air. 
  As such, I recognize the mining companies’ appeal and grant 
it in part to order the following: 
  a) each mining company shall be liable for the recovery of the 
environment in the area of land that it is effectively polluted, 
directly or indirectly; 
  b) joint and several liability remains in place among mining 
companies that have polluted, even indirectly, the same area of 
land, regardless of what each company’s contribution was to the 
degradation of the area.  It does not matter if one company has 
 
 160. Id. at 19-20. 
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polluted more than another, then, if they did in some form 
contribute to the damage in the same place, they shall both be 
jointly and severally liable for the recovery; 
  c) the same criteria apply for the recovery of subsoil 
areas; . . . .161 
Thus, although the court was willing to use joint and several 
liability to achieve the goals mentioned above – facilitating access 
to justice and increasing the likelihood of solvency of some liable 
party – the court once again found a barrier in discussions of 
causation.  While the judgment as altered by the STJ seems 
written so as to stay faithful to requirement of causation, it ends 
up in a curious middle ground – a mining company that has not 
directly acted in a specific area could potentially be liable for the 
full amount of damage if classified as an indirect cause of 
pollution in that area, even where several other companies have 
polluted there directly.  Under the reasoning behind joint and 
several liability, this is, of course, the desired result, so as to 
better guarantee access to justice and eliminate the need (at least 
in the phase of showing liability) for complex, imprecise, and 
perhaps impossible measurements of which sort of polluter was 
responsible for a specific harm.  However, the STJ’s decision lacks 
this clarity and simplicity, requiring the definition of multiple 
overlapping sectors for which each company is responsible. 
d. Liability of the State 
As stated above, the definition of “polluter” in Brazilian law 
includes those who directly and indirectly cause environmental 
degradation.162  In addition to allowing for the possibility of 
multiple liable parties, this definition explicitly includes public as 
well as private entities.163  As noted in other cases, persons or 
entities that allow pollution to occur, whether by action or 
omission, or that finance activities that result in pollution, may 
all be held equally under the law as having caused environmental 
damage.164  Public entities’ liability in Brazil is based on the 
 
 161. Id. at 21. 
 162. Lei No. 6.938, de 31 Agosto de 1981 (Braz.). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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strong set of affirmative duties placed on the state in the 
Constitution and in environmental laws.  This foundation and its 
application is discussed below in two STJ precedents related to 
state liability for environmental harm, whether by direct state 
action or by omission. 
The STJ judged one such case in 2005, brought by federal 
environmental prosecutors against all levels of government – the 
Federal Government, the State of Paraná, the Municipality of Foz 
do Iguaçu – as well as IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental agency.165  
The Public Prosecutor originally filed the suit, seeking a court 
order to halt the municipality’s construction of a road along the 
edge of the Paraná River, as well as an order for the three levels 
of government to restore the environment and vegetation in the 
affected area.166  The State of Paraná appealed the case to the 
STJ, arguing that it was not a proper defendant in the case, but 
rather that the federal agency, IBAMA, was liable for having 
authorized the construction.167 
Justice Castro Meira, writing for the Second Panel in 
affirming the state’s liability, focused on the specific application 
of civil liability to the state; however, it provides an important 
discussion of public entities’ liability in general for environmental 
damage.  Justice Castro Meira explains the constitutional 
foundation of state liability: 
  Art. 23, VI, of the [Federal] Constitution establishes the 
common authority of the Union, States, Federal District, and 
Municipalities related to the protection of the environment and to 
combating all forms of pollution, and the heading to art. 225 
provides for the right of all to an ecologically balanced 
environment, and imposes on the Government and on society the 
duty to defend it and preserve it for present and future 
generations.  In the paragraphs [of art. 225] are found the 
directives for the State (in the broad sense) to use in effectuating 
these ideals, the consequences that result from failure to observe 
these duties, and the objective nature of liability in such 
cases . . . . 
 
 165. S.T.J., REsp No. 604.725/PR (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Castro Meira, 
21.06.2005 (Aug. 22, 2005), at 5 (Braz.). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 8. 
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  . . . . 
  Thus, in accordance with the Constitution, the Government, 
which includes all public entities, and therefore, the appellant 
State, has the duty to preserve and to monitor the preservation of 
the environment.  In this case, the State, as part of its monitoring 
duty, should have required an Environmental Impact Study and 
report, the holding of public hearings on the subject, or even the 
suspension of the construction.168 
In this portion of the opinion, the case presents another concrete 
example of the strength of the environmental provisions in the 
Brazilian Constitution.  Attached with environmental rights in 
Article 225 come duties on the part of the government and 
society, and in this case, the STJ applies that duty in support of a 
decision that holds a state jointly liable along with federal and 
local government for failing to meet that duty.  The Constitution 
allows the paradigm shift; if courts are thus willing to enforce the 
duty, then the constitutional provision can carry with it real 
weight to affect the way in which public entities undertake their 
administrative responsibilities. 
Justice Castro Meira, having discussed the constitutional 
foundation, proceeds to describe how Brazil’s federal law includes 
each level of government’s duties regarding the environment.169  
The State of Paraná’s argument was that it had not acted in any 
way so as to make it liable in this particular case, and that the 
responsibility lied with other governmental entities; however, 
according to Justice Castro Meira, this contention “encounters 
obstacles” throughout the National Environmental Policy Act.170  
For example, as quoted earlier, Article 3 of the Act explicitly 
provides that actors, both public and private, may be held liable 
for indirectly causing environmental damage.171  Article 6 lays 
out the organization of the National Environment System 
(SISNAMA), comprised of municipal, state, and federal 
authorities, and includes specific requirements for state agencies 
within this framework to “control and monitor activities capable 
 
 168. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis of “all public entities” added). 
 169. Id. at 9-12. 
 170. Id. at 9. 
 171. Id.; Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 3, cl. IV. 
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of causing environmental degradation”172 and for states 
themselves to “establish . . . complementary norms and standards 
related to the environment.”173 
A second major case, decided by the STJ in 2009, is the case 
cited above for its discussion of joint and several liability, 
regarding the construction in and illegal occupation of a protected 
area, Jacuripanga State Park, in São Paulo.174  In the opinion, 
the Second Panel also addresses the issue of whether the 
Government’s duty to enforce environmental law and monitor 
activities potentially harmful to the environment is mandatory 
(or merely discretionary), as well as the resulting liability when 
the duty is not met.  This is rooted in the theory of the State’s 
responsibility to implement and enforce the rule of law: 
  The matter under analysis deals with the co-liability of the 
State when, as a consequence of its omission in exercising the 
duty-power of environmental control and enforcement, 
environmental damage is caused by a private party that invaded 
an Area of Strict Protection (State Park), of public ownership, 
constructing buildings and undergoing agricultural activities 
therein. 
  . . . . 
  One initial question that is placed by the present Special 
Appeal is that of knowing whether, in Brazilian law, 
environmental (and urbanistic) control and enforcement fit, as 
powers of the Administration, within the scope of a loose, 
discretionary system, or within the realm of binding 
administrative obligations.  If the conclusion is, as it will be, that 
urbanistic-environmental control and enforcement is within the 
realm of unequivocal, unwaivable, unrenounceable, and non-
lapsing state duties and powers, the question that then follows is 
in regard to the content of this duty-power, namely, regarding 
the measures and provisions of implementation that are expected 
– rectius, that are required – of the Government, as well as 
regarding the legal consequences derived from its nonfulfillment. 
  . . . . 
 
 172. REsp No. 604.725/PR, at 10; Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 6, caput, cl. V. 
 173. REsp No. 604.725/PR, at 10; Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 6, § 1. 
 174. S.T.J., REsp No. 1.071.741/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 24.03.2009 (Dec. 16, 2010) (Braz.); see also supra notes 154–155 and 
accompanying text. 
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  There is no longer any doubt, especially in light of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988, that the legal order charges the State, more 
in terms of a duty rather than a right or power, with the function 
of implementing the law, including against itself or against the 
immediate interests of the Administrator on duty.  It would seem 
nonsensical to require private parties to fulfill and observe the 
law, while attributing to public servants, depending on 
convenience or whim, the choice of zealously watching over it or 
leaving it to chance . . . .175 
With this foundation, the Court turns to the specific duties of 
the Government in relation to the environment turning both to 
constitutional provisions as well as federal law: 
  The duty-power of environmental control and monitoring (the 
duty-power of implementation), while also inherent to the State 
exercise of police power, springs forth directly from the 
constitutional text (especially arts. 23, VI–VII, 170, VI, and 225) 
and from infraconstitutional legislation, especially the National 
Environmental Policy Act (Law 6.938/81, arts. 2, I, V, 6) and Law 
9.605/98 (Crimes Against the Environment Act). 
  . . . . 
  This duty-power imposed on Government involves two central 
principles of contemporary state organization.  First, the 
standard of administrative integrity that is expected of public 
officials, in acting, as well as in their omissions and reactions.  
Second, the principle of the rule of law, which itself is a limit on 
the action of the State, but is equally a tool to combat inaction 
when positive duties are expected of it. 
  . . . . 
  [In Article 225 of the Constitution], the Brazilian State, in all 
of its facets and levels, appears as the guardian and guarantor of 
the fundamental right to an ecologically balanced environment.  
The heading and paragraphs of art. 225 of the Constitution list 
several concrete tasks related to this broad police power, which, 
in the terms of art. 23, VI (“protect the environment and combat 
pollution in any form”) and VII (“preserve the forests, fauna, and 
flora”), is added to the scope of common authority of the Union, 
States and Federal District, and, inasmuch as it is of local 
interest, the Municipalities (with special emphasis on urban 
 
 175. REsp No. 1.071.741/SP, at 7. 
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control and monitoring).  Following this line of reasoning, under 
art. 70, § 1, of Law 9.605/1998, “the employees of environmental 
agencies that make up the National Environmental System – 
SISNAMA, that are designated for monitoring activities,” among 
others, are also charged with the duty-power of implementing 
[environmental law]. 
  The National Environmental Policy, in the framework 
provided by Law 6.938/81, includes among other principles 
“governmental action in maintaining ecological balance” and the 
“control and zoning of effectively and potentially polluting 
activities” (art. 2, I and V, emphasis added). 
  More direct and unequivocal is art. 70, § 3 of Law 9.605/1998 
[Crimes Against the Environment Act], according to which an 
environmental authority, when it “becomes aware of an 
environmental infraction is obligated to begin an immediate 
investigation, through its own administrative process, under 
penalty of co-liability” (emphasis added).  “Immediate 
investigation” must be understood as much more than the simple 
identification of the degrader and mere adoption of formal, 
insincere actions, for these would be meaningless if they were not 
designed to effectively maintain (from trespass) or recover (in the 
case of illegal appropriation) possession of environmental assets, 
require the violator to repair the damage caused, and apply, if 
necessary, administrative and penal sanctions against him for 
his reprehensible conduct.176 
This opinion provides a more detailed discussion of the park 
in question, and how governmental entities should act in order to 
maintain protected areas.  In the absence of diligent action by the 
state, the Court concludes, conservation of such areas cannot be 
successful: 
  Reference should also be made to the National System of 
Protected Areas Act, or SNUC [Portuguese acronym] (Lei 
9.985/2000), given that the degradation in the present case 
occurred in what was then the State Park of Jacupiranga, 
created by the government of the State of São Paulo in 1969, with 
approximately 150,000 hectares, due to its notable ecological 
importance (for sheltering one of the largest remaining tracts of 
Atlantic Forest) and geological importance (due to its great 
 
 176. Id. at 8-10. 
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caverns), an area so large that, in 2008, it was divided into three 
parks (Caverna do Diabo, Rio Turvo, and Lagamar de Cananéia 
Parks, under the terms of art. 5 of State Law 12.810/2008). 
  In its mission to protect the ecologically balanced environment 
for present and future generations, as the representative for the 
preservation and restoration of essential ecological processes, it is 
the State’s duty “to define, in all units of the Federation, 
territorial spaces and their components which are to receive 
special protection, any alterations and suppressions being 
allowed only by means of law, and any use which may harm the 
integrity of the attributes which justify their protection being 
forbidden” (Federal Constitution, art. 225, § 1, III). 
  The creation of Protected Areas is not an end in itself; rather, 
it is linked to the clear legal and constitutional objectives of the 
protection of Nature.  As such, their establishment does not 
resolve, halt, or mitigate the biodiversity crisis – directly 
associated, in Brazil, to rapid and unsustainable habitat 
destruction – if it is not accompanied by state commitment to 
sincerely and effectively look after their physical and ecological 
integrity and provide for transparent and democratic technical 
management.  If not, nothing more than a “system of paper- or 
façade-protected areas” will exist, a no-man’s land, where 
authorities’ omissions are recognized by the “on-duty” land 
degraders as implicit authorization for illicit deforestation and 
occupation.177 
Imposing liability for environmental damage on the state 
presents a dilemma.  As Justice Benjamin indicates in the 
opinion, Brazilian law tasks governmental entities with 
overseeing protected areas.  It is easy to see how, without 
effective monitoring, protected areas become “paper parks.”  
Placing financial responsibility on the state when pollution or 
environmental degradation occurs on protected lands clearly 
provides an incentive for the government to act and take its 
regulatory authority and police power seriously.  However, state 
liability, when applied, means that the financial burden may 
ultimately be paid by the citizenry as a whole if the state is 
unable to obtain contributory payments from other liable parties, 
whether for political or financial reasons.  Although it may induce 
 
 177. Id. at 10-12 (translation of the excerpt from the Constitution is from the 
Georgetown Political Database of the Americas, supra note 24). 
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greater oversight as a general policy, in the cases where 
government enforcement is truly lacking, private actors that 
benefit from environmental degradation may be able to 
externalize the costs on the rest of the public, due to regulators 
that were willing to turn a blind eye. 
3.  When and What Type of Liability May Be Imposed 
Once the issues of determining what environmental damage 
is and which parties – whether individuals, multiple private 
parties, or the state – have “caused” it, there remain additional 
legal and policy issues, including when and what type of liability 
may be imposed.  The STJ has decided cases on these points, 
applying the statutory time limits on environmental claims and 
interpreting statutory language as to whether injunctive and 
pecuniary relief may be sought simultaneously in appropriate 
cases. 
a. Statute of Limitations 
Environmental damage may often be diffuse and latent, 
undetected for many years.  Even when damage is more readily 
ascertained, the gradual internalization of environmental policy 
or the scarcity of prosecutorial resources may mean that claims 
for environmental damage are brought long after activities that 
cause degradation are undertaken.  Citing the special nature of 
rights that environmental laws protect, the STJ has held that 
some claims can be non-lapsing, exempt from statutes of 
limitation.  This is seen, for example, in the Second Panel’s 
opinion in the case of coal mining in the Criciúma area of Santa 
Catarina in southern Brazil.178  Justice Otávio de Noronha wrote: 
  With regard to the statute of limitations, when dealing with a 
claim seeking the recovery of an environmentally degraded area, 
the right to a collective action is non-lapsing. 
  . . . . 
  In this case, the Court of Appeals below found that the 
damage alleged by the Public Prosecutors is of a continuous 
 
 178. S.T.J., REsp No. 647.493/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. João Otávio de 
Noronha, 22.05.2007 (Oct. 22, 2007) (Braz.); see also supra notes 157-161. 
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nature, a fact that unequivocally defeats the argument that any 
time limitations should apply.179 
The Panel further cites another STJ case for the point that in 
the event of “continuous violation of rights . . . by successive acts 
of pollution,” the time period in the statute of limitations runs 
only from the last polluting act.180 
The Second Panel’s recent case involving damages for illegal 
logging in the territory of the Ashaninka-Kampa, indigenous 
people in the Amazonian State of Acre, also raised the issue of 
time limitations on environmental claims.181  Before the STJ, the 
parties argued about whether a twenty-year or a five-year (which 
would have precluded the claim) limit would apply.  The Second 
Panel, however, unanimously held that the right to reparations 
for environmental damage is non-lapsing, so no statute of 
limitations applies.182  The Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice Eliana Calmon, justified the rule because it “deals with a 
right inherent to life.”183  Notwithstanding any benefits of 
statutes of limitations in providing stability or certainty 
regarding liability, the Court was particularly concerned with 
how, under a statute of limitations, past or present inaction 
would bind future owners of a common asset.  Given that 
“environmental assets [belong] not only to current but also future 
generations,” the Court asked: “How could the current generation 
assure its right to pollute, to the detriment of generations yet 
unborn?”184 
As the Court reasons, eliminating a time limit on collective 
claims is keeping with the principle of intergenerational equity in 
environmental law.  The Ashaninka-Kampa people’s case is still 
under review; after being upheld by the STJ, it was sent in 
 
 179. Id. at 14-15. 
 180. S.T.J., REsp No. 20.645/SC (4th Panel), Relator: Min. Barros Monteiro, 
07.10.2002 (Oct. 7, 2002), at 16 (Braz.) (majority opinion, Min. Cesar Asfor 
Rocha). 
 181. S.T.J., REsp No. 1.120.117/AC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 
10.11.2009 (Oct. 19, 2009) (Braz.); see also supra notes 125-126 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. Id. at 15-16. 
 183. Id. at 15. 
 184. Id. (citation omitted). 
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August 2011 on appeal to the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to 
determine whether the removal of the statute of limitations is 
consistent with the Constitution.185 
b. Combination of Injunctive and Monetary Relief 
Some of the cases dealt with above have involved injunctive 
relief, ordering the restoration and recovery of the environment in 
certain areas (such as the reforestation of APPs and legal 
reserves), while others deal with monetary relief, ordering the 
payment of financial compensation. 
As stated earlier, Article 14 of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, in establishing strict liability for environmental 
damage, specifies that such strict liability is “without prejudice to 
penalties defined by federal, state, and municipal legislation,” 
allowing that penalties – whether civil, criminal, or 
administrative – may apply in conjunction with the duty to 
provide compensation for whatever damage a polluter causes.186  
One key issue, however, is who may bring a legal action – and 
what form of legal relief may be sought – against a polluter. 
The Public Civil Action (ação civil pública) is, as mentioned 
in the Introduction, a critical tool established in 1985, and 
expanded in 1990 by the Consumer Defense Code,187 for the 
defense of public (diffuse) and collective interests.  The Public 
Civil Action Act provides that such actions “may seek an order to 
pay monetary damages or an injunction to perform or refrain 
from performing an act.”188  The STJ has, in several instances, 
been called on to interpret this provision.  In 2005, the Court 
judged a public civil action that had come before it on the appeal 
of a metalworking company.189  The Supreme Court of the State 
 
 185. S.T.J., REsp No. 1.120.117/AC, Relator: Min. Felix Fischer, 03.08.2011 
(Aug. 15, 2011) (Braz.) (admitting appeal to STF). 
 186. Lei No. 6.938/81, art. 14 (Braz.), heading; see also CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] art. 225, ¶ 3. 
 187. See Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, art. 117 (Braz.). 
 188. Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985 [Public Civil Action Act], art. 3, 
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l7347orig.htm (emphasis 
added). 
 189. S.T.J., REsp No. 605.323/MG (1st Panel), Relator: Min. José Delgado, 
18.08.2005 (Oct. 17, 2005) (majority opinion, Min. Teori Albino Zavascki). 
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of Minas Gerais had ordered the company both to cease activity 
that was causing environmental degradation as well as to pay 
monetary damages for environmental harm caused.190 
The issue in the case was how to interpret the word “or” in 
Article 3 of the Public Civil Action Act, quoted above.191  The 
Rapporteur in the case, Justice José Delgado, cited various 
precedents from the First Panel of the STJ, concluding that the 
word “or” suggested an “alternative” rather than a “cumulative” 
character of the law – the proponent of a public civil action may 
seek either an injunction or monetary damages, but not both.192  
Given that the court below had ordered the metalworking 
company both to pay damages and to cease certain activity, 
Justice Delgado voted to grant the appeal and reverse the 
decision.193 
However, by a majority vote, the First Panel overruled 
Justice Delgado and upheld the judgment below.194  Justice Teori 
Albino Zavascki wrote for the majority: 
Supported by the jurisprudence of this Panel, [Justice Delgado] 
concluded that, in a public civil action, cumulative requests for 
injunctive or monetary remedies, are improper.  He quoted, to 
this effect, art. 3 of Law 7.347/85, according to which “A public 
civil action may seek an order to pay monetary damages or an 
injunction to perform or refrain from performing an act.”  
According to the opinion, this provision would be interpreted as 
presenting alternatives, making the intended combination of 
demands impracticable.  This conclusion, based on a literal 
interpretation, brings with it, as can be seen, an extremely 
limiting effect on the effectiveness of the public civil action as an 
instrument for guaranteeing collective and diffuse rights, 
compromising its ability to adequately accomplish its purpose, 
 
 190. Id. at 9. 
 191. See id. at 6 (Min. José Delgado, dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 5-6 (citing S.T.J., AgRg no REsp No. 180.620/SP (1st Panel), 
Relator: Min. Francisco Falcão, 12.07.2000 (Mar. 26, 2001) (Braz.); S.T.J., REsp 
No. 205.153/GO (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Francisco Falcão, 20.06.2000 (Aug. 21, 
2000) (Braz.); S.T.J., REsp No. 247.162/SP (1st Panel), Relator: Min. Garcia 
Vieira, 28.03.2000 (May 8, 2000) (Braz.); S.T.J., REsp No. 94.298/RS (1st Panel), 
Relator: Min. Garcia Vieira, 06.05.1999 (June 21, 1999) (Braz.)). 
 193. REsp No. 605.323/MG, at 6. 
 194. Id. at 2. 
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specifically as it relates to protecting the environment.  Due to 
this concern, I undertook an examination of the record (pedido de 
vista), and bring before the Panel for consideration, the reasoning 
that, in my view, supports a different interpretation.195 
The focus in the majority opinion is on how to ensure the 
effectiveness of the public civil action in protecting environmental 
rights.  The Court dismisses an easy resolution to the case based 
on grammatical considerations, positing that “or” can be 
interpreted both in terms of exclusive or simultaneously possible 
alternatives.196  The opinion continues, explaining the 
significance of the public civil action as a procedural mechanism: 
  In the present case what is investigated is the meaning of a 
procedural norm.  Procedure is an instrument, a means to serve 
an end: the guarantee of substantive rights. . .  [I]f procedure is 
an instrument, it must be . . . interpreted according to the end for 
which it was created.  Now, the public civil action is designed to 
guarantee diffuse and collective rights, among which, as 
expressly provided in the Constitution, are those related to the 
environment (art. 129, III).  It must be understood, consequently, 
that [the action] is an instrument with sufficient strength to put 
in effect, judicially, the protection of this substantive right in the 
best manner and to the greatest extent possible.  Only thus will it 
be adequate and useful.  If it cannot serve the substantive right, 
the public civil action will be a worthless tool.197 
Having explained the theory behind how to interpret 
procedure, Justice Albino Zavascki discusses its application to the 
substantive law in question, explaining the constitutional and 
legal foundation for seeking various types of remedies (injunctive 
and financial) in environmental law – and, looking to other, 
related laws, how the civil public action fits into the framework of 
upholding the guarantees in the substantive law: 
  [Article 225 of the Constitution] attributed to the Government 
and to society the duty to defend and preserve the environment 
and, specifically to persons who cause harm, the obligation to 
 
 195. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) 
 196. Id. at 10-11. 
 197. Id. at 11. 
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repair the damage.  Prevention and [reparations] are, therefore, 
constitutional values placed in the system of environmental 
protection.  [The opinion then cites environmental law jurists and 
the National Environmental Policy Act as to the principle of 
prevention, the polluter-pays principle, and the protection and 
recovery of protected areas.] 
  There is no doubt, then, that in light of the substantive law, 
environmental law contains various types of duties and 
obligations, which must be rendered by personal action (doing or 
refraining from doing something) and by paying an amount of 
money (financial compensation), obligations that are not 
mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, are cumulative in some 
cases.  As to this question, we should highlight the provision in 
art. 4, VII, [of the National Environmental Policy Act], as it 
discusses the liability of the polluter, referring to the obligation 
to repair and/or provide compensation for damage caused.  And 
the principle of prevention, from which comes the “legal duty to 
avoid causing environmental damage” (citation omitted), leads, 
necessarily, to a negative obligation, to refrain from acting.  In 
sum, from the point of view of the substantive law, 
environmental law imposes various – and cumulative – 
obligations, to do, refrain from doing, or pay damages. 
  If this is what the substantive law – constitutional and 
infraconstitutional – guarantees for the environment, it cannot 
be suggested that the lawmakers would deny plaintiffs in favor of 
the environment adequate procedural means to achieve those 
ends.  The lawmakers would not commit such a sin.  It is for this 
that, in the interpretation of art. 3 of Law 7.347/85, the 
conjunction “or” must be considered in the sense of addition (as 
this serves the principle of adequacy) and not in the sense of 
exclusion (which would make the public civil action inadequate, if 
not useless).  This conclusion is confirmed systematically, 
especially in light of supervening legislation.  [The opinion then 
cites to the Public Civil Action Act, as amended by Law 8.078/90 
(Consumer Defense Code)].198 
Justice Albino Zavascki moves from this exposition to an 
argument based on procedural efficiency and on the exceptional 
nature of the public civil action.  Applying the case in question as 
an example, Justice Albino Zavascki concludes that joining the 
 
 198. Id. at 11-13 (emphasis added). 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/4
  
530 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
claims for different types of relief is necessary and appropriate for 
an efficient and coherent adjudication of the relevant rights and 
interests: 
Further, it would make no sense to suggest that if environmental 
law demands various types of performance that such must be 
secured in separate actions, one for each type of obligation.  To do 
so, aside from going against the principles of instrumentality and 
of procedural efficiency, would create the possibility of 
contradictory and incompatible judgments for the same set of 
facts and law.  The record provides a clear example.  In the face 
of the alleged injury to the environment caused by the defendant, 
the following relief was requested: an obligation to refrain from 
acting (to cease releasing waste effluents into the river; to cease 
emitting particulate matter into the atmosphere); to do 
(implement anti-pollution control systems, meet the emissions 
standards for solid particulates applicable in the urban area, 
improve the treatment of liquid effluents, repair environmental 
damage already caused); and to pay (compensation for the 
environmental damage already caused that cannot be specifically 
repaired in natura).  The claim, clearly, seeks the guarantee of 
environmental interests through combined application of the 
principle of prevention (negative obligations – to refrain from 
doing), the polluter-pays principle (positive obligations – to do) 
and the principle of full reparation (payment of compensation).  
The parties and the cause of action are the same for all claims.  
The final goal is, in all three cases, the same: guaranteeing the 
protection of the environment from harms caused in these 
specific circumstances.  What remains to be joined is only the 
requested means, which consist of various obligations of 
performance.  To require, for each type of performance, a 
separate suit would, without a doubt, go against the 
aforementioned principles of instrumentality and procedural 
efficiency, as well as creating the opportunity for conflicting 
decisions.  If such a burden were imposed on the proponent of a 
public civil action, it would be better to simply use a common 
ordinary proceeding to bring environmental cases, given that 
there would be no obstacle to joining the claims in such a 
proceeding.  Now, it would make no sense to deny in a public civil 
action, created especially as an alternative to facilitate the 
61
  
2012] BRAZIL’S GREEN COURT 531 
 
defense of diffuse rights, that which would be permitted in 
asserting any other right through in a common proceeding.199 
In sum, this case carries with it the same lesson in statutory 
interpretation discussed earlier, in that the STJ has 
demonstrated an increased willingness to interpret federal law in 
a way so as to allow the effective functioning of environmental 
statutes, giving broader effect to claims rooted in environmental 
rights and interests.200  This is a crucial development, especially 
in this instance, as in the enforcement of propter rem obligations 
under the Forest Code and the restrictions on burning sugar cane 
straw, where these new rulings by the STJ have superseded prior 
statutory interpretations. 
Overall, the STJ’s jurisprudence trends toward a stronger 
application of the polluter-pays, prevention, and precautionary 
principles, interpreting law to allow for effective tools for putting 
the National Environmental Policy Act’s provision on strict 
liability for environmental harms into practice.  Important 
innovations and developments have helped, such as the 
characterization of Forest Code obligations as propter rem and 
ameliorating the difficulties associated with showing causation in 
cases of deforestation and land degradation.  The Brazilian model 
of holding the state liable is another strong factor in imposing 
civil liability in the STJ.  While there are limits on the 
desirability of state liability – it places the burden on society as a 
whole, the very owner of environmental assets – it can be used as 
an accountability mechanism that can help change the culture of 
environmental compliance.  However, to be effective and not 
overly burdensome on the population, state liability requires the 
community to buy into the idea and hold policymakers politically 
accountable when the government is forced to pay for 
environmental damage. 
 
 199. Id. at 13. 
 200. See supra Part III.A. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS: CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Brazil, given its size, economic power, and natural resources, 
is and must be a crucial actor in efforts to address the world’s 
greatest environmental crises, from biodiversity loss to climate 
change, from dwindling water supplies to air pollution that 
threatens human health.  This is especially true in dealing with 
the protection of biomes that Brazil shares with other South 
American nations, such as the Amazon and the Pantanal.  Other 
developing countries will undoubtedly look toward Brazil’s 
advances (and missteps) in environmental law as an example, but 
in order for the STJ and other institutions to extend this 
influence, the language barrier (Portuguese is not widely spoken 
in much of the world) must be broken. 
Because Brazil has included environmental rights into its 
constitutional framework, the potential for legal solutions to 
manage the country’s domestic and international responsibilities 
are strong.  Yet, these legal solutions cannot become practical 
realities without the cooperation of all the political branches, 
various non-state actors, and the citizens themselves. 
The STJ, although only in its third decade as an institution, 
occupies a key position in implementing environmental policy in 
Brazil.  As the focal point for interpretation of environmental law, 
the STJ has the responsibility of ensuring that the law, though 
instituted by the legislative branch, is given proper and effective 
meaning.  The STJ has, especially over the past several years, 
developed itself as Brazil’s “green court,” demonstrating through 
its jurisprudence a commitment to environmental rights as an 
essential element of the public order. 
The STJ’s decisions speak for themselves, establishing a 
trend toward stricter application of Brazil’s environmental laws 
and enforcement of the strict liability system for environmental 
harms.  The few cases cited here, selected from hundreds decided 
by the court, serve as a broad illustration of this trend, and 
despite long-standing cultural pressures and the multitude of 
other social challenges Brazil faces, the STJ has increasingly held 
its ground in interpreting environmental standards, reasoning 
that such social challenges will not and cannot be solved by 
turning a blind eye to environmental problems – although 
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legislative backlash on the Forest Code may test this resolve.  As 
Justice Benjamin wrote in 1999, over a decade ago: 
Brazil, it is argued, has today one of the most advanced systems 
of legal protection for the environment.  Legislating as to the 
essentials is no longer a priority for the future (or the present).  
We have already done it.  What we hope for now from 
environmental agencies and from citizens, organized or not, is 
compliance with the legal requirements, which are often nothing 
more than lifeless words.201 
Three cases in particular provide examples of how the Court 
has sought to fulfill this goal, challenging societal resistance to 
environmental law, particularly by those with vested interests 
that depend on relaxed enforcement.  First is the case regarding 
mangrove swamps, discussed earlier in the application of strict 
liability.202  The Court’s opinion concludes with the following 
discussion of resistance to the enforcement of environmental law 
and the objective role of the judge in applying it: 
  As in all fields of law that regulate human behavior, 
legislative reform does not always reflect, immediately or fully, 
popular perception.  Old practices ordinarily persist, even when 
they have been banned by recent law.  It is what we call the 
resistance of the Ancien Régime to legislative changes, 
dissonance between the law and its subjects that persists, 
notwithstanding the solid scientific and ethic arguments that 
inspired the legal reform.  In the protection of mangrove swamps, 
given the divergence between law and practice, the role of the 
judge is not reduced to the mere cold application of the relevant 
law against obstinate violators, for it is expected that he, through 
the strength of his decisions, effectuate the process of 
internalizing the change in those who still think and act as 
before. 
  From the common human point of view, mangrove swamps 
continue as always – ecosystems that are not normally included 
on Nature’s postcards.  Yet this did not stop lawmakers from 
recognizing their importance for us and all living beings that 
depend on that environment. 
 
 201. Benjamin, supra note 34, at 82. 
 202. See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text. 
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  . . . . 
  This is not a “romantic idea of returning nature to its original 
state” as the appellants suggest, but rather the simple judicial 
fulfillment of what is in the Constitution and the statute.  In 
Brazil, courts do not create obligations for environmental 
protection.  They spring forth from the law, after having passed 
through the analysis of Parliament.  Therefore, we do not need 
activist judges, for the activism is done by the law and the 
constitutional text.  Unlike other countries, our Judiciary is not 
impeded by a sea of gaps in the law or a series of legislative half-
words.  If a gap exists, it is not due to the lack of a statute, nor 
even a defect in the statute; it is because of the absence of or a 
deficiency in administrative and judicial implementation of the 
unequivocal environmental duties established by law.203 
In Brazil, then, the focus should be on compliance and 
enforcement; the law is strong, but cultural acceptance of the law 
and effective enforcement are lacking.  The continuous challenge, 
despite over forty-five years of history of the current Forest Code 
and over twenty years of experience with the Constitution of 
1988, is to make the law in practice match the plain language of 
the law as written. 
As a second example, as discussed earlier in this article, the 
legal forest reserve requirement in the Forest Code requires 
landowners not only to maintain the reserve, but also to officially 
register the portion to be kept aside as the reserve.204  In line 
with the decision that the legal forest reserve requirement 
applies to new owners that acquire rural property as a propter 
rem obligation,205 the STJ decided that the obligation to register 
the legal reserve is also applicable to new landowners, even when 
the previous owner has failed to do so or deforested the entire 
parcel of land.206  Justice João Otávio de Noronha, writing for the 
 
 203. S.T.J., REsp No. 650.728 (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 23.10.2007 (Dec. 2, 2009), at 15-16 (Braz.) (emphasis added). 
 204. CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C.FLOR.] [FOREST CODE] art. 16, § 8, Lei No. 4771, de 
15 de Setembro de 1965 (Braz.), available at https://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
ccivil_03/leis/l4771.htm; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 206. S.T.J., RMS No. 18.301/MG (2d Panel), Relator: Min. João Otávio de 
Noronha, 28.04.2005 (Oct. 3, 2005) (Braz.). 
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Second Panel, issued the decision, highlighting the continued 
challenge of gaining social acceptance of the statute: 
  [The Forest Code], in providing for the setting-aside of a 
portion of rural properties to establish a legal forest reserve, is 
the result of a felicitous and necessary ecological consciousness 
that has arisen in society due to the effects of natural disasters 
that have occurred over time, resulting from mankind’s 
unchecked environmental degradation.  These nefarious 
consequences gradually lead to an awareness that natural 
resources must be used sustainably and preserved so as to assure 
a high quality of life for future generations. 
  . . . . 
  The ecologically balanced environment was elevated to the 
category of constitutional dogma as a right enjoyed by all (art. 
225 of the Constitution), encompassing present and future 
generations.  However, there still remains a considerable portion 
of the population that resists this collective idea, seeing only 
their immediate interests. 
  In this sense, to free landowners from the registration 
requirement is to empty the law of all its content.  The same 
applies to acquirers of any title to the land, in the act of 
registering the property.  There is no sense in freeing them from 
their respective registration requirements, seeing that the legal 
reserve is a restriction on property rights, established legally 
since 1965.  In this regard, I emphasize that this restriction will 
be forty years old this coming September [2005], giving sufficient 
time for incorporation into the culture, and not justifying that, 
even today, there are owners resistant to establishing the 
reserve.207 
Finally, Justice Benjamin wrote the following in an opinion 
on preserving the cultural heritage of Brasília: 
In Brazil, “knocking down” and “replacing the old with the new” 
have always been the order of the day, in the city and in the 
fields.  In the spirit of the Brazilian, carved out over 500 years of 
historical conquest of the natural and of the old, progress becomes 
synonymous with denying the value and legitimacy of the past 
and the future, such that our “immediatism” only allows us to 
recognize the identity, legitimacy, and the necessities of the 
 
 207. Id. at 6-8. 
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present.  As such, the common tendency is to reject, discredit, or 
obstruct any legal regime that stands in the way of tractors, 
cranes, dynamite, chainsaws, disregard, clientelism, or innocent 
ignorance.208 
The “immediatism” of desires for growth and development 
creates a backlash against strict enforcement of environmental 
law, seen in the debate over reform of the Forest Code.  In order 
to maintain support for strict environmental regulations, 
environmentalists must be able to effectively respond to general 
fears that environmental regulation will hinder Brazil’s economic 
and social progress. 
Ultimately, what the STJ’s environmental jurisprudence 
shows is that in Brazil, application of environmental law will be a 
product of the country’s specific system, with strong laws and 
constitutional footing, but with an increasingly environmentally-
conscious population in conflict with interests that reject the 
growing emphasis on implementation of the law.  As such, the 
focus in the near future is likely to be on the consolidation of 
existing laws.  Within this context, the STJ’s adherence to 
environmental law may not be popular among all sectors of 
society, but it is a crucial component of the rule of law – and a key 
manifestation of inter-generational equity, refusing to allow the 
interests of today to interfere with the Constitution, now nearly a 
generation old, or with its enumerated environmental rights 
granted to future generations. 
The STJ’s trend toward stronger enforcement of 
environmental law begs the question of where the remaining 
problems may be in Brazil.  Courts can fulfill the judicial role, but 
rely on the other branches both to craft the law and execute it.  
More research is needed to show how prosecutors and non-state 
actors such as NGOs can be better at identifying environmental 
problems and bringing them to courts’ attention.  If courts apply 
the law, that can be considered a success in itself, but even more 
successful is a society in which the norms are internalized, 
 
 208. S.T.J., REsp No. 840.918/DF (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 
14.10.2008 (Sept. 10, 2010), at 33 (Braz.) (majority opinion, Min. Antonio 
Herman Benjamin). 
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consolidated, and followed without always relying on the 
arbitrator. 
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